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PREFACE 
This is the 27th of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to 
livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation. 
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries.   Animals  are a 
source of food, more specifically protein for human diets, income, employment and 
possibly foreign exchange. For low income producers, livestock can serve as a store of 
wealth, provide draught power and organic fertiliser for crop production and a means 
of transport. Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries, 
though starting from a low base, is growing rapidly.  
This paper argues that, given a functional macroeconomic and institutional 
framework, livestock policies would be pro-poor if they included: (i) policies 
￿establishing the basics for livestock production￿, including secure and adequate 
access to basic production inputs, such as land and water, as well as risk coping 
mechanisms for natural disasters and price shocks; (ii) policies ￿kick-starting domestic 
livestock markets￿, such as a pro-poor functioning of the credit market, animal health 
and extension services delivery, and adequate access to output markets for 
smallholders; and (iii) policies ￿supporting and expanding livestock markets￿, 
encompassing research for improving feeds and livestock breeds, food quality control 
and trade-supporting policies. 
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is 
welcome by the author, PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and 
Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Disclaimer 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any 
country, territory, city or area or its authorities or concerning the delimitations of its 
frontiers or boundaries. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and 
do not constitute in any way the official position of the FAO. 
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Increasing population, growth in GDP per capita and urbanization are boosting the 
demand for food of animal origin in developing countries.  This structural break in the 
livestock market has been labelled the ￿Livestock Revolution￿ (Delgado et al., 1999).  
It provides tremendous opportunities to poverty reduction, an estimated 42 percent of 
the poor worldwide being dependent on livestock as part of their livelihood (Thornton 
et al., 2002).  As market imperfections loom large in rural areas, however, decision 
makers should design and implement the appropriate policies to make the poor fully 
exploit gains from livestock demand.  This paper examines the recent pro-poor thrusts 
of macro and sector development policies in eighteen developing countries to identify 
whether governments are tapping into the pro-poor opportunities offered by the 
livestock revolution.  The countries examined are Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania 
and Uganda in East Africa; Burkina Faso, Mali and Sudan in West Africa; Bangladesh, 
India and Nepal in South Asia; Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam in Southeast 
Asia; and Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru in Latin America. 
A pro-poor livestock policy framework 
Asymmetric information and intrinsically imperfect and missing markets lock the poor 
into portfolios of activities of low returns, preventing them from positively reacting to 
price signals and allocating their scarce resources efficiently, even in those countries 
with a comparative advantage in livestock production (e.g. de Janvry and Sadoulet, 
2005).  Following much disillusionment with the liberalization thrust in terms of 
poverty reduction, governments recognized this status of affairs and at the end of the 
1990s posed poverty reduction and pro-poor growth at the centre of their 
development strategies.  A framework for comparative pro-poor livestock policy 
analysis is presented to assess whether this shift in the political agendas is expected 
to benefit the poor livestock holders, filling a gap in the socio-economic literature 
which has essentially investigated macroeconomic, industrial and agricultural sector 
policies. 
Taking into account the specificities of livestock production and the broad literature 
on poverty traps (e.g. Dorward at al., 2004a, 2004b), it is argued that, given a 
functional macroeconomic and institutional framework, livestock policies would be 
more pro-poor if they included strategies for: (i) ￿establishing the basics for livestock 
production￿; (ii) ￿kick-starting domestic livestock markets￿; and (iii) ￿supporting and 
expanding livestock markets￿.  Policies that ￿establish the basics￿ refer to those public 
actions that allow poor livestock producers to have secure and adequate access to 
basic production inputs, such as land, feed and water for animals, as well as risk 
coping mechanisms for natural disasters and price shocks.  Secure access to 
production inputs and stable income are necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
small producers to respond to price signals efficiently, because of widespread 
imperfections in intertemporal and input and output markets.  Polices to ￿kick start 
domestic markets￿ are therefore required to allow the poor to exploit market 
opportunities.  These include all actions intended to promote a pro-poor functioning 
of the credit market, an efficient and pro-poor system of animal health and extension 
services delivery, and adequate access to output markets for smallholders.  Finally, 
policies to ￿support and expand livestock markets￿ are those long-term public actions 
that encourage and support the sustainable production of high quality commodities; 
they encompass research for improving feeds and livestock breeds, environmental 
protection, food quality control, certification and grading, which are necessary 
components for products to be competitive in international markets and to avoid 
smallholders be crowded out by foreign competitors. Executive Summary 
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The livestock revolution bypassing the poor 
Preliminary ILRI data mapping livestock and poverty highlight that a large share of the 
poor raise livestock in the case-study countries: roughly 60 percent in East and West 
Africa, around 40 percent in South and Southeast Asia and about 28 percent in Latin 
America (Thornton et al., 2002).  National governments, however, have so far not 
taken advantages of the poverty-reducing opportunities of livestock development.   
Time series analysis comparing 1984-2004 trends in the demand for vis-￿-vis 
indigenous supply of beef, milk, poultry, eggs, pigmeat and meat from sheep and 
goats show that, on average, local meat/milk production has largely not satisfied 
increased national demand.  In 1994-2003 only in 18 over 108 of the cases analyzed 
livestock production met with the prospected increase in local demand, with milk and 
poultry accounting for over 55 percent of successful cases; quite the opposite, in 24 
percent of the cases per-capita production declined during 1994-2003, with population 
growing faster than meat/milk production; finally, for most livestock commodities 
average annual growth rate fell in 1994-2003 compared to 1984-1993, with a 
concomitant worsening of the livestock trade balance.  The demand-driven livestock 
revolution, therefore, appears not to have translated into incentives for local 
meat/milk producers; meaning that in the last twenty years decision makers have not 
designed and/or implemented successful policies reducing frictions and imperfections 
in rural markets to the benefits of poor livestock producers. 
Unbalanced pro-poor livestock policies 
The current shift in policy making, which has placed poverty reduction at the centre 
of the development agenda, is not expected to change the above trends significantly.  
First, most national policy documents fail to appreciate the role of livestock in 
poverty reduction; in particular, they treat livestock production and poverty reduction 
disjointedly, and implicitly assume that the overall objective for the sub-sector is 
increased meat/milk production, rather than mitigating against poverty through 
livestock production.  Production-increasing policies, however, do not necessarily 
benefit the poor livestock keepers who are an extremely heterogeneous group and 
often, being extremely poor, maximize a survival rather than a production function.  
Second, while ongoing macroeconomic and institutional policies, which follow the 
mainstream economic theory, are likely to sustain a conducive market environment, 
agricultural and livestock sector policies are not adequately addressing the most 
binding constraints affecting livestock holders.  Policies ￿establishing the basics￿ are 
given secondary relevance as issues such as access to land and water, which are 
recurrently identified among the main constraints for livestock keepers both in crop-
livestock and pastoral production systems, are treated en-passant; most policy 
documents also fail to detail ex-ante and/or ex-post intervention strategies to insure 
smallholders against natural disasters.  Conversely, national policy documents 
emphasize the importance of strategies to ￿kick-start domestic markets￿, with a focus 
on input over output markets: significant reforms are ongoing in the financial sector 
and in animal health and extension services delivery, while the issues of marketing 
and market information are marginally addressed.  Finally, limited attention is given 
to policies expected to expand and support livestock production by the poor in the 
long run.  Research activities have been reformed, either through centralizing or 
decentralizing research institutes, and countries are increasingly open to global 
markets and willing to satisfy international sanitary standards.  These reforms, 
however, appear to respond to macroeconomic concerns rather than aiming at 
reducing poverty levels. 
Redressing livestock policies 
The present macroeconomic and institutional policies appear to be pro-poor, and 
should provide opportunities for livestock keepers to escape out of poverty.  On the 
other hand, agricultural and livestock sub-sector policies are somewhat unbalanced Executive Summary 
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and do not address some of the binding constraints preventing the poor from taking 
advantages of growing livestock demand.  In particular, agricultural and livestock 
sector policies are biased towards ￿kick-starting livestock domestic markets￿ and 
￿expanding livestock markets￿ vis-￿-vis policies ￿establishing the basics for livestock 
production￿.  Yet, in several circumstances lack of secure access to land, feed and 
water significantly reduces the effectiveness of input and output market policies, with 
livestock holders overproducing food for insurance, being slow in technology adoption, 
and accumulating rather than investing savings.  It is argued that to make smallholder 
producers deriving benefits from an increasingly market-friendly environment, 
governments should better target the causal links between livestock development and 
poverty reduction, having the livestock-producing household rather than a production 
function as the policy entry point into the sector.  This would imply focusing not only 
on market policies but also on strategies reducing vulnerability and transaction costs 
to markets for smallholders.  Only then will input and output market, production-
enhancing and trade-supporting policies be effectively self-sustainable and pro-poor.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Increasing population, income growth and urbanization in developing countries are 
boosting the demand for food of animal origin at unprecedented level.  According to 
FAO food balance sheets, in the developing world per-capita cereal consumption 
diminished from 164 to 158 kg/year between 1982 to 2002; conversely, per-capita 
meat consumption increased from 14.9 to 28.5 kg/year and milk consumption from 
24.8 to 45.6 lit/year (FAOSTAT, 2004).  De Haan et al. (2001) reported that aggregate 
meat demand will grow from 209 million tons in 1997 to 327 million tons by 2020, and 
milk consumption from 422 to 648 million tons.  Delgado et al. (1999), who extensively 
analyzed this structural shift in food demand, labeled this trend the ￿Livestock 
Revolution￿. 
The poor could gain from the livestock revolution (e.g. Brown, 2003).  Preliminary 
estimates indicate that, of the 1.3 billion poor worldwide, around 42 percent (555 
million) depend on livestock as part of their livelihood: about 41 million are 
pastoralists mainly located in arid and semi-arid areas; 46 million are landless 
livestock keepers; roughly 103 million are small farmers in irrigated zones; and 365 
million are small landholders in rainfed areas (Thornton et al., 2002).  However, (i) 
past livestock development strategies and projects were not adequately poverty 
focused and rarely improved the livelihoods of the poor (LID, 1999); (ii) recent 
national and supra-national policies, which have been primarily driven by the 
liberalization thrust, have often not benefited the poor livestock producers suffering 
from incomplete and imperfect markets (IFAD, 2004); (iii) smallholder producers are 
disadvantaged both in the national and international political arenas as, being poor, 
poorly educated and dispersed, face high opportunity costs of collective actions 
(Binswanger and Deininger, 1997; Leonard, 2004). 
This paper examines the recent pro-poor shift of macro and sector development 
policies by governments in eighteen countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to 
figure out whether they are tapping into the pro-poor opportunities offered by the 
livestock revolution.  It does not intend to comprehensively review and comment 
existing policies; it rather attempts to detect and record broad policy trends, 
similarities and differences between geographical regions and countries and, if 
possible, identify policy gaps and inconsistencies.  The policy documents referred to, 
either directly or indirectly, are listed in table A1.  More detailed policy documents 
are certainly available and may contradict some of the country-specific statements 
made below, but are not expected to invalidate the key conclusions of the paper, 
which are general in nature. 
The paper is as follows.  The next section outlines a theoretical framework for cross-
country pro-poor livestock policy analysis, filling a gap in the socio-economic 
literature which has essentially investigated macroeconomic, industrial and 
agricultural sector policies.  Section three compares the potential contribution of 
livestock to poverty reduction and reviews the performance of the sector in Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda in East Africa; Burkina Faso, Mali and Sudan in 
West Africa; Bangladesh, India and Nepal in South Asia; Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and 
Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru in Latin America.  It shows 
that livestock development could be a way out of poverty for many rural households 
and that, in the last two decades, indigenous meat production has been largely unable 
to satisfy the local demand for food of animal origin and, in several circumstances, 
even to keep pace with population growth.  The ensuing question is whether these 
trends will be reversed.  Section four to six assess the place of livestock in the current 
policy agendas, and review existing macroeconomic, institutional and sector policies 
affecting its performance.  It is found that policies are consistent across geographical 
regions and agro-ecological zones and largely neglect the livestock sector.  In 
particular, current policies decouple livestock production from the household 
economy, marginally address the basic constraints affecting smallholder livestock 1. Introduction 
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producers, and are excessively biased towards animal health services.  Section seven 
summarizes the main findings, and prospects options to redress current policies and 
make the livestock revolution a pathway out of poverty. 
  
3 
2. THE LINEAR PRO-POOR LIVESTOCK POLICY PROCESS 
One of the most widely used frameworks to analyze development policies is the 
objectives-constraints-instruments approach, which assumes that governments 
attempt to solve a stochastic optimization problem by maximizing an objective 
function subject to constraints implied by the socio-economic structure (Colman and 
Young, 1989; Ellis, 1992; Norton, 2004).  This model can be thought as a linear three-
step policy sequence with government: (i) defining the policy objective(s); (ii) 
selecting the appropriate policy instruments given the existing constraints; (iii) 
applying the policy instruments (Salvatici and Quieti, 2003; Sutton, 1999). 
The linear policy model has been criticized on several grounds.  First, it implicitly 
equates government to a social planner maximizing a social welfare function, an 
autocratic ruler maximising dynastic wealth or a democracy making the median voter 
decisive.  In the real world, rent seeking behaviours by decision makers and lobbying 
by interest groups may seriously distort policy-making (Binswanger and Deininger, 
1997).  Second, information failure and limited physical and human resources prevent 
a priori assessment of all policy options and outcomes, as well as secondary and 
tributary effects of government actions.  Policy makers are used to consider only a 
small number of alternative objectives/instruments, tend to prefer options that differ 
slightly from existing policies (this behaviour is referred to as the incrementalist 
model) and/or to follow ￿development narratives￿ (theories grown to become 
conventional wisdom) (Killick, 1989; Sutton, 1999).  Third, the dichotomy between 
policy decisions and implementation mechanism opens up escape routes through 
which policy-makers can avoid responsibility for failures (Crosby, 1996; Sutter, 1999). 
The linear policy model appears thus inadequate to comprehensively appreciate in-
country policy processes, which should be better understood as a ￿chaos of purposes 
and accidents￿ (Sutton, 1999, p.5), through a combination of theories and models 
from a variety of disciplines.  For instance, political economy studies considering the 
historical background, the institutional architecture and the broad socio-economic 
composition of interest groups and lobbies give much more insights on policy making 
than the linear model (e.g. Fairfield, 2004, for Bolivia, and Vu, 2003, for Vietnam).  
The linear policy process, however, is perhaps the easiest to conceptualize; and its 
simplicity allows looking at patterns in a cross-section of countries in the attempt to 
identify policy thrusts and trends.  As it refers to an infinite space of 
objectives/instruments, a discrete classification of policies is crucial to make it 
meaningful for cross-country comparison. 
This paper depends upon the assumption that one of the objectives of policy makers 
should be reducing poverty through livestock development.  This requires two 
conditions to be satisfied: (i) that a large proportion of poor people hold livestock; (ii) 
that decision-makers have appreciated the potential contribution of livestock to 
poverty reduction.  It then classifies policies into two broad categories: 
macroeconomic and institutional policies, which are broad-encompassing by 
construction, and agricultural and livestock sub-sector policies, which are sector 
specific.  In the socio-economic literature, however, while macro and agricultural 
sector policies have been examined under multiple respects (e.g. Bullock and 
Salhofer, 2003; Colman and Young, 1989; Norton, 2004), livestock policies have been 
either completely overlooked or examined as a mixture of macroeconomic, 
agricultural and livestock sub-sector interventions, which do not always benefit poor 
livestock holders.
1  For example, between 1994 and 2003 Mali GDP growth averaged 
                                                 
1 In his book on Agricultural Development Policy, Norton (2004) does not make any reference to livestock policies, which are 
implicitly considered as an appendage to macroeconomic and crop sector policies.  A recent review by Ehui et al. (2003) on 
ILRI contribution to Livestock Policy Analysis revisits macroeconomic and ￿system level￿ policies that are likely to affect small 
livestock holders.  Macroeconomic policies are monetary, fiscal and trade policies; system level policies refer to production 
technology; marketing and market access; credit and pricing; nutrition; land tenure; natural resource management.  Similar 2. The Linear Pro-poor Livestock Policy Process 
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5.6 percent per year, with improving macroeconomic fundamentals.  The country 
today is a fair competitive economy and scores well in most measures of governance.  
Yet, Mali is still desperately poor, with over 66 percent of the rural poor holding 
livestock, despite the country having a comparative advantage in livestock production 
due to the availability of animal feed, quality pastureland and expanding domestic 
and export markets (Cobham and Robson, 1997; Kaufmann et al., 2003; Thornton et 
al., 2002; World Bank, 2004b).  This puzzle has no macroeconomic answer; it mainly 
illustrates that an apparently conducive macro-environment is not sufficient to drive 
livestock holders out of poverty.  And Mali is not an exception: poverty traps loom 
large in rural Bangladesh, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and Madagascar, where the median 
time in poverty is one or more lifetimes (Barrett and McPeak, 2005).  The policy 
challenge, therefore, is not only to create a conducive macroeconomic and 
institutional environment, but also to make the growth process pro-poor, and livestock 
holders deriving benefits from market opportunities and escaping from low-income 
equilibria.
2 
Taking into account the broad literature on poverty traps (Azariadis and Stachurski, 
2005; Dorward et al. 2004a, 2004b), this paper argues that, given a favorable 
macroeconomic and institutional environment, livestock policies will be pro-poor and 
sustainable according to a three-step sequence which includes: (i) ￿establishing the 
basics for smallholder livestock production￿; (ii) ￿kick-starting domestic livestock 
markets￿; (iii) ￿maintaining and expanding livestock markets￿. 
                                                                                                                                                          
overlapping themes are examined by the ILRI Livestock Policy Analysis training manual (ILRI, 1995), which reviews market, 
price and trade policies; marketing policies; budget and manpower planning principles; and land tenure policies.  More 
livestock-specific are the analyses by Jarvis (1986) and LID (1999).  In a seminal book on Livestock Development in Latin 
America, Jarvis (1986) first reviews the economic theory of and trends in livestock production, and then discusses a number 
of constraints to the development of the sector: border protection; uncertainty and instability in international markets; 
control and eradication of animal diseases; research on mixed farming systems and pastures improvement; management and 
technical assistance; animal and product grading.  Finally, LID (1999) Livestock in Poverty-Focused Development shows that 
strategies intended to promote a pro-poor development of the livestock sector have mainly focused on animal disease 
control; new production resources, including animal on credit and access to improved feed; breed selection; storage and 
processing of livestock products and by-products; access to market; information on improved production and marketing 
technologies.  It concludes that most of these programs fell short of expectations because they overlooked the institutional 
components of livestock production. 
2 There are debates about the meaning of pro-poor growth and pro-poor policies.  While any growth pattern is expected to 
reduce absolute poverty (Dollar and Kraay, 2002), its ultimate impact on the poor depends on how inequality is affected.  
Two agents have an income of US$1 and US$10 respectively; relative inequality is 10 (10/1) and absolute inequality is 9 (10-
1).  A distributional neutral growth rate of 5% would raise their income to US$1.05 and US$10.5 respectively.  The poorer 
agent is better off indeed, but the rich one continues to be 10 times richer and the absolute income difference has increased 
from US$ 9 to US$ 9.45 (relative inequality has not changed but absolute inequality has risen).  Pro-poor growth, therefore, is 
said to result if the growth rate of the income of the poor is greater than average growth.  For instance, if the income of the 
poor grows by 10% (to 1.1US$) and that of the rich by 5% (to 10.5US$), both agents will be better off but relative inequality 
will decrease, as the rich man will be only 9.5 times richer.  However, absolute inequality will increase from 9 to 9.4 US$.  A 
more radical criterion for pro-poor growth would require that also absolute inequality declines.  This implies that the share 
of the poor in the income increase is at least as their population share.  For example, in the second case, of the total income 
increase of 0.6US$, at least 31 cents should go to the poor (who are 1/2 of the population) and no more than 29 cents to the 
rich.  Under this scenario, both relative inequality (10.29/1.31 = 7.9) and absolute inequality (10.29 ￿ 1.31 = 8.98) would fall 
(see Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Lopez, 2004; White and Anderson, 2001).  Definitions of pro-poor growth have been translated 
into definitions of pro-poor policies.  Pasha (2002) suggests that pro-poor policies should improve both the absolute and 
relative conditions of the poor; Jan Vandemoortele (2004, p.6), leader of the UNDP Poverty Group, maintains that ￿pro-poor 
policies imply that the social and economic indicators for the disadvantaged people improve more rapidly that those for the 
rest of society.  It is not sufficient that the indicators for the poor improve; they have to improve at a faster pace than for 
the non-poor because absolute poverty always has a relative dimension￿.  The definitions of pro-poor growth and pro-poor 
policies are certainly appealing, but not really useful in an operational context.  On the one hand, they would imply that 
governments should prefer policies which promote an average growth rate of say 1%, with the income of the poor growing at 
2%, over policies that promote an average growth rate of 10% with the income of the poor growing at 8%.  On the other hand, 
they do not facilitate identifying policies that actually lead to pro-poor growth, and policy recommendations often end up to 
be extremely general, such as investing in agriculture and improving the institutional infrastructure.  To avoid 
misunderstandings, this paper simply assumes that growth is pro-poor if it reduces poverty, regardless of any changes on the 
inequality fronts, and that policies that mitigate against poverty are pro-poor (see Ravallion and Chen, 2003). 2. The Linear Pro-poor Livestock Policy Process 
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Table 1:   A framework for pro-poor livestock policy analysis 




































Creating a conducive  
macro environment 
Macroeconomic policies 
and institutional reforms 
Sound macroeconomic fundamentals and high 
quality institutions are positively associated with 
economic and social indicators of well-being. 
Macro-micro linkages to the rural economy are 
e.g. mediated through the inflation rate, the real 
exchange rate, fiscal policies and ag non-ag terms 
of trade. 
 
      
Securing access 
to land, feed 
and water 
Land laws in crop-livestock 
systems and pastoral 
areas; forage / feed 
policies  
Inadequate access to land and lack of feed and 
forage are main developmental constraints for poor 
livestock producers. The land market is rarely pro-
poor as land prices exceed the present discounted 
value of income streams derived from farming 
because of the social/collateral value of land. Even 
with perfect credit markets only those with 
accumulated savings can acquire land at market 
price without curtailing their consumption stream. 

































































(Public) ex-ante and / or 
ex-post risk-coping 
mechanisms for natural 
disasters, animal killer 
diseases, human diseases 
and price volatility 
Variability of returns prevents livestock holders 
from making efficient use of their resources and 
leads to overshooting livestock production cycles. 
Imperfect and asymmetric information and high 
transaction costs constrain insurance markets. 
Securing access 
to livestock / 
animal health 
services 
Public / private 
distribution/regulation of 
livestock / animal health 
services 
 
Animal diseases negatively impact on livestock 
production; livestock holders are often poor, 
weakly educated and dispersed and unable to 
effectively demand livestock services both 
through the market and through policy, as their 
opportunity cost of collective action is extremely 
high. 
Securing access 
to credit and 
other inputs 
Government intervention / 
regulation to establish pro-
poor financial and input 
markets 
Livestock holders need credit to access production 
increasing inputs; imperfect and asymmetric 
information and high transaction costs ration their 
access to credit and other production inputs as 

















































(Public) investment for and 
regulation / management 
of slaughterhouses and 
milk processing plants; 
regulation of local 
livestock markets 
Slaughterhouses and processing plants require 
investments with a high indivisible component 
which can create frictions/imperfections in the 
production chain. Livestock are among the most 
repeatedly taxed agricultural commodities: transit 
and market access fees are common, especially 








Public regulation / 
management of disease 
surveillance; quarantine; 
quality control; 
food safety regulations; 
animal welfare 
Some livestock-associated public goods are 
underprovided by the markets, because of their 
non-rivalry and non-excludability. These goods are 
necessary for countries to compete in 
international markets and poor livestock holders 
































































Public regulation / funding 
of research centres; public 
management of public 
research centres 
Private research centres are likely to invest in 
profitable breeds/technologies, and poor livestock 
holders rarely constitute an attractive market for 
the private sector. 
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Policies that ￿establish the basics￿ include all public actions that support adequate 
access to land, feed and water, provide risk coping mechanisms for natural disasters, 
including ￿killer diseases￿ of livestock, guard against extreme price volatility, and 
protect human health.  Uncertainty and market imperfections, in fact, prevent 
smallholder producers from having secure access to these inputs, which is a necessary 
condition for efficient resource allocation.  For example, in mixed crop-livestock 
farming systems, secure access to land allows farmers to use resources (such as family 
labour) that in many cases are underused and encourages lump-sum investments in 
physical and human capital, with increasing supply of crops residues and stubbles for 
animals (e.g. Deininger, 2001; World Bank, 2003b).  In pastoral areas, secure right to 
use different patches of land allows livestock keepers to access fodder and water 
continuously and reduces risks associated with droughts (e.g. Burke, 2004; Kamara et 
al., 2004). 
Policies to ￿kick-start domestic markets￿ aim at moving the markets away from 
inefficient equilibria by allowing all economic agents, including the poor, to fully 
exploit gains from livestock demand.  Access to the ￿basics￿, in fact, would not be 
sufficient for taking livestock keepers out of poverty because of transaction 
costs/imperfections in financial and input/output markets (e.g. Banjeree and 
Newman, 1994; Carter and Olinto, 2003).  Livestock production is associated with 
investments with high indivisible components that, coupled with imperfect 
intertemporal markets and limited access to output markets, force the poor into 
portfolios with low returns.  In Ethiopia, for example, entering into simple livestock 
trading may require an initial investment of about 20 to 40 percent of per capita 
annual income, which is a huge amount (Dercon, 2004).  In Sudan, over 20 types of 
taxes and fees are charged for transporting sheep from Darfur to Port Sudan, making it 
often unprofitable for smallholders to access markets (Aklilu, 2002).  The way 
governments regulate credit markets, the supply of preventive and curative animal 
health services, drug distribution as well as access to output markets, therefore, is 
crucial for paving a way for livestock holders to escape poverty. 
Policies to ￿expand livestock markets￿ include all those long-term public actions that 
promote and support production of high quality commodities and encompass (public) 
research for improving feeds and livestock breeds, environment protection, and food 
quality control, certification and grading, which are necessary (but not sufficient) 
requirements for products to be competitive in international markets.  All countries, 
in fact, are imposing stringent requirements on food imports which cover pesticide 
residues, contaminants, microbiological parameters, pests, diseases and other 
hygienic variables.  Concerns are that these standards may prevent developing 
countries from benefiting from growing market integration; in Uruguay, for example, 
following a Foot-and-Mouth disease outbreak in 2000, the value of beef exports fell by 
40 percent (World Bank, 2005). 
Figure 1 outlines the pro-poor livestock linear policy process, which reflects the 
structure of this paper. 
 2. The Linear Pro-poor Livestock Policy Process 
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3. THE LIVESTOCK SECTOR AND POVERTY IN AFRICA, ASIA  
AND LATIN AMERICA 
3.1  The potential contribution of livestock to poverty reduction 
Livestock policies will be analysed in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania in 
East Africa; Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal in West Africa; Bangladesh, India and 
Nepal in South Asia; Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru in Latin America. 
These countries belong to the low to lower-middle income country group and to the 
low to medium Human Development Index (HDI) country category.
3   There are 
substantial variations in level of development and economic structure, with Africa 
scoring particularly low both in terms of GDP per capita and HDI, and Latin American 
countries boasting the highest level of economic and human development, followed by 
the fast-growing economies of Southeast Asia.  Agriculture accounts for over 30 
percent of GDP in Asia and Africa, with employment in the sector being at 85 percent 
in West Africa and 65 to 70 percent in Asia and East Africa.  Conversely, it contributes 
11.3 and 7.3 percent to GDP and employment in the three Andean countries (table A2) 
(UNDP, 2004; World Bank, 2004b). 
The livestock sub-sector accounts for 4 to 12 percent of GDP, and one-third to one-
fifth of agricultural value added, with no significant changes in the last two decades.  
Considerable differences exist between geographical regions.  In East and West Africa, 
especially in Ethiopia, Mali, Sudan and Tanzania, population density is relatively 
sparse; pasture land makes over 70 percent of the agricultural areas; grass-land based 
ruminant production systems are prevalent; livestock contribute between 30 to 52 
percent to agricultural value added and up to 21.4 percent to GDP.  In South and 
Southeast Asia, rural population density is high; animals are mostly raised on mixed 
rainfed/irrigated farms, which constitute about 70 to 80 percent of all agricultural 
land; the livestock sub-sector accounts for 18 to 25 percent of agricultural value 
added and less than 8 percent of GDP.  In the Andean countries, rural population 
density is low; pastures cover about 80 percent of agricultural land; livestock are 
produced extensively and contribute 37 and 4 percent to agricultural and national GDP 
respectively (tables A2, A3) (FAOSTAT, 2004; Otte and Upton, 2005; World Bank, 
2004b). 
Poverty rates are high in all case-study countries: over 33 percent of the population 
lives on less than 1 US$ a day, or 38 percent below the national poverty line.  In 
absolute terms, Africa and South Asia harbour the majority of the poor, with over 370 
million rural poor living in India, 50 million in Bangladesh and 28 million in Ethiopia.  
Rural poverty rates are around 35 to 45 percent, main exceptions being Thailand and 
Vietnam in Southeast Asia (15.5 and 57.2 percent), and Bolivia and Peru in Latin 
America (79.1 and 64.7 percent) (table A3) (Thornton et al., 2002; World Bank, 2001). 
Most of the rural poor raise livestock.  Preliminary ILRI estimates indicate that, on 
average, in the countries examined 46.5 percent of the rural poor own livestock, with 
                                                 
3 The World Bank classifies countries according to per-capita Gross National Income (GNI), which is the sum of value added by 
all residents producers in the country (i.e. GDP) plus net factor income from abroad.  In 2003, countries with a GNI per 
capita of less than US$ 765 were classified as low-income, and countries with a GNI per capita of between US$ 766 to 3,035 
as lower-middle income.  The UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of three basic indicators of 
human development: life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate and GDP.  UNDP classifies countries into three clusters: high 
human development (with an HDI of 0.800 or above), medium human development (0.500￿0.799) and low human 
development (less than 0.500). 3. The Livestock Sector and Poverty in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
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over 60 percent in East and West Africa, around 40 percent in South and Southeast 
Asia, and about 28 percent in Latin America (Thornton et al., 2002).  Table A3 displays 
the established proportions of rural poor keeping livestock per country and regional 
aggregate suggesting that the pro-poor effectiveness of livestock policies is ￿high￿ if 
over 50 percent of the rural poor raise livestock, ￿medium￿ if between 25 to 50 
percent keep animals, and ￿low￿ if less than 25 percent are livestock holders.  This 
criterion indicates that pro-poor livestock policies are expected to be effective in East 
and West Africa, where over 50 percent of the rural poor raise livestock, and likely to 
have a medium to high impact in Asian and Latin American countries, where between 
25 to 50 percent of the rural poor are livestock holders.
4 
3.2  The livestock revolution: a missed opportunity 
The potential poverty-reducing opportunities of livestock development have not been 
tapped into by policy makers in developing countries: time series analyses of livestock 
production for the last two decades indicate that the performance of the sector has 
been to a large extent unsatisfactory.  For 1984-2003 and the two sub-periods 1984-
1993 and 1994-2003, for each country and regional aggregate, the following indicators 
have been calculated for beef, milk, poultry meat, eggs, pigmeat, and meat from 
sheep and goat: average production, annual growth rate of production, coefficient of 
variation of annual growth rate, performance, trend in net trade, and rank.
5  Data are 
from FAOSTAT (2004) and the World Bank Development Indicators Database (World 
Bank, 2004b). 
Average production is calculated taking into account changes in inventory, formal and 
informal slaughter and international trade for any given year and computing the 
arithmetic mean for 1984-2003, 1984-1993 and 1994-2003.  All figures are converted 
to carcass weight to account for variations in productivity. 
                                                 
4A deeper exploratory analysis of ILRI data allows identifying priority areas of interventions according to agro-ecological 
zones.  Livestock contribution to household income varies substantially within different production systems, being about 70 
to 80 percent in pastoral areas, 10 to 20 percent in mixed rainfed production systems, around 25 to 35 percent in irrigated 
zones, and 1 to 2 percent in urban and peri-urban areas (proportions estimated as livestock value added over agricultural 
GDP in predominantly pastoral/mixed rainfed/mixed irrigated countries (FAOSTAT, 2004).  Results are consistent with 
household survey analyses, e.g. Bekure, 1983; Maltsoglou and Taniguchi, 2004; Roxas et al., 1997).
  Table A3 shows the 
income-weighted distribution of poor livestock holders per agro-ecological zones, assuming that livestock contribution to 
household income is 75 percent in pastoral areas, 15 percent in rainfed production systems, 20 percent in irrigated farms, 
and 1.5 percent in urban and peri-urban areas.  It indicates that interventions targeted at smallholders in mixed-rainfed and 
pastoral production systems are the most promising in terms of poverty reduction in Africa and Latin America.  Pro-poor 
livestock policies in Asia should focus on mixed-rainfed and, to a lesser extent, on mixed-irrigated production systems, where 
the majority of population lives. 
5 See Goletti et al. (2001) for a similar analysis. 3. The Livestock Sector and Poverty in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
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Table 2:   Estimating total production from livestock 
  Total production for period   
equals  End of period inventory   
minus  Beginning of period 
i  
 
equals  Change in inventory   (accounts for herd liquidation/rebuilding) 
plus Slaughter   
plus  Informal slaughter  (includes home consumption) 
plus Exports   
minus Imports   
 
Growth rate is computed as a semi-logarithmic function,  υ β α + + = t yt) ln( , where y 
represents a livestock commodity, t denotes time and the trend in growth is 
calculated as 1 ) exp( − β . 
 
Variability of growth is assessed by computing the coefficient of variation of the 
percentage change of the year to year growth rate, namely by dividing the standard 
deviation of  1 1 / ) ( − − − t t t y y y  by the period mean. 
 
Performance of livestock production is assessed against population and GDP per capita 
growth.  Ceteris paribus, that is with constant real prices and unvarying preferences, 
the demand for livestock products  ) (d  increases according to  g p d ∆ + ∆ = ∆ η , where 
d ∆  is the percentage change in meat/milk demand,  p ∆ is population growth rate, 
g ∆ is the growth in real per capita income, and η  is the income elasticity of the 
demand for livestock products.  For low-income countries, the estimated meat/milk 
demand elasticities with respect to changes in income are varied but mostly around 
one, meaning that a percent increase in per capita GDP should increase livestock 
products demand by around the same percentage.  Elasticities are lower at higher 
income level (e.g. FAO, 1974; Rey et al., 1992; Kumar, 1998).  Performance is 
assessed looking at the difference between indigenous livestock production and 
g p ∆ + ∆ η  under four elasticity scenarios:  0 = η ;  5 . 0 = η ;  75 . 0 = η  and  1 = η .  The 
simple difference between percentage changes in population and meat/milk 
production ( 0 = η ) gives an indication of whether livestock production has kept the 
pace of population growth; a more realistic situation is represented by 1 = η .  Looking 
at  5 . 0 = η  and  75 . 0 = η  facilitates differentiating countries according to their 
capacity to satisfy prospected changes in meat/milk demand.  The performance is 
assessed as ￿high￿ if the difference between growth in total production from livestock, 
on the one hand, and growth in population and the η -weighted per capita income, on 
the other hand, is greater than or equal to 0.5; ￿medium￿, if it is included between 
0.5 and -0.5; and ￿low￿, if it is equal to or less than -0.5.  This classification is of 
course arbitrary and susceptible to criticisms, but is an attempt to compare the 
performance of the livestock sector in a cross-section of countries with the available 
data. 3. The Livestock Sector and Poverty in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
11 
Trend in trade is computed by looking at the slope of a linear trend fitted for the 
balance of trade for each livestock commodity for the period 1994-2003.  A positive 
sign (+) indicates that exports (Mt) grew faster than imports (Mt); a negative sing (-) 
indicates that imports grew faster than exports.  Even though livestock typically 
account for a modest share of all agricultural trade, trend in net trade can be thought 
as a robustness test for the performance indicators: it is expected that countries with 
low (high) performance should record a negative (positive) trend in the trade balance 
as local livestock production has not been (has been) able to meet national demand. 
Rank is computed by looking at the performance of each country relative to the other 
countries under the  1 = η  scenario. 
Over the period 1984-2003, it is not possible to identify clear common trends for 
livestock products, countries or regional aggregates (tables A4-A9 and tables 3-8).   
There are however a number of regularities: 
•  Aggregate data indicate that between 1984-1993 and 1994-2003 average livestock 
production increased in all countries, by a minimum of 25 percent for beef to a 
maximum of over 110 percent for poultry meat. 
•  In terms of growth rate, poultry and pigmeat production performed better than other 
livestock commodities (poultry grew at 6.2 percent per year); with meat from large 
and small ruminants recording the lowest growth rates (annual beef production grew 
at 2.9 percent). 
•  Variability of growth rates has been high for poultry and pigmeat, and particularly low 
for eggs and milk. 
•  On average, for all livestock commodities annual growth rate fell in 1994-2003 
compared to 1984-1993. 
•  Over the 1994-2003 period, in 17 percent of the cases analyzed (18/108), production 
satisfied growing local demand for food of animal origin, with milk and poultry 
accounting for over 55 percent of successful cases. 
•  In 24 percent of the cases (26/108), per capita production declined during 1994-2003, 
with population growing faster than meat/milk production.  The performances of beef, 
eggs and sheep and goat meat have been the worst. 
•  In over 73 percent of the cases (79/108) the coefficient of the trend in net trade is of 
the expected sign under the  1 = η  scenario, i.e. when local demand is assumed to be 
satisfied by indigenous livestock production. 
•  Latin American case study countries performed better than the other regional 
aggregates, with East and West Africa study countries recording the worst 
performance. 
•  Peru is the best performer in 1994-2003.  Production of milk, poultry, eggs and sheep 
and goats met the prospected increase in demand. 
•  Senegal is the worst performer.  Per-capita production of beef, milk, poultry and eggs 
declined over the 1994-2003 period. 3. The Livestock Sector and Poverty in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
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Table 3:   Estimated performance of beef production, 1994-2003 
η = 0 η = 0.5 η = 0.75 η = 1 Rank
Ethiopia high low low low 9
Kenya high medium medium medium 3
Sudan high medium low low 7
Tanzania low low low low 10
Uganda medium low low low 14
Averagem e d i u m l o w l o w l o w 3
Burkina Faso highm e d i u ml o w l o w 5
Mali low low low low 17
Senega l l o wl o wl o wl o w 1 5
Averagem e d i u m l o w l o w l o w 2
Bangladesh medium low low low 11
India low low low low 16
Nepal low low low low 13
Averagel o w l o w l o w l o w 5
Cambodia highm e d i u ml o w l o w 8
Laos highh i ghm e d i u ml o w 4
Thailand low low low low 18
Viet Nam high low low low 12
Averageh i ghl o wl o wl o w 4
Bolivia medium low low low 6
Ecuador high high high high 1
Peru high high high medium 2
Averageh i ghh i gh medium medium 1
Total high low low low  
Table 4:  Estimated performance of milk production, 1994-2003 
η = 0 η = 0.5 η = 0.75 η = 1 Rank
Ethiopia high high high high 2
Kenya high high high high 3
Sudan medium low low low 14
Tanzania high medium low low 9
Uganda high low low low 12
Averageh i gh medium low low 3
Burkina Faso highh i ghl o w m e d i u m 8
Mali high low low low 13
Senegal low low low low 17
Average medium low low low 2
Bangladesh low low low low 15
India highm e d i u ml o w l o w 1 1
Nepal high low low low 10
Averageh i gh low low low 5
Cambodia low low low low 18
Laos low low low low 16
Thailand high high high high 1
Viet Nam high high high high 4
Averageh i ghh i ghl o wl o w 4
Bolivia high high low medium 7
Ecuador high high medium medium 6
Peru high high medium high 5
Averageh i ghh i gh medium medium 1
Total high medium low low  
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Table 5:  Estimated performance of poultry production, 1994-2003 
η = 0 η = 0.5 η = 0.75 η = 1 Rank
Ethiopia high medium low low 10
Kenya low low low low 9
Sudan medium low low low 14
Tanzania high medium low low 8
Uganda high low low low 13
Averageh i gh medium medium medium 3
Burkina Faso highl o wl o wl o w 1 1
Mali medium low low low 16
Senegal low low low low 18
Averageh i ghh i ghm e d i u ml o w 4
Bangladesh low low low low 17
India highh i ghh i ghh i gh1
Nepal high high high medium 6
Averageh i ghh i ghh i ghh i gh2
Cambodia medium low low low 15
Laos highm e d i u ml o w l o w 1 2
Thailand high high high high 5
Viet Nam high high high high 4
Averageh i ghm e d i u ml o w l o w 3
Bolivia high high medium medium 7
Ecuador high high high high 2
Peru high high high high 3
Averageh i ghh i ghh i ghh i gh1
Total high high high medium  
 
Table 6:  Estimated performance of egg production, 1994-2003 
η = 0 η = 0.5 η = 0.75 η = 1 Rank
Ethiopia high low low low 7
Kenya high high high medium 3
Sudan medium low low low 11
Tanzania low low low low 16
Uganda medium low low low 12
Average medium low low low 3
B u r k i n a  F a s o l o wl o wl o wl o w 1 5
Mali low low low low 17
Senega l l o wl o wl o wl o w 1 3
Averagel o w l o w l o w l o w 4
Bangladesh high low low low 9
India highm e d i u ml o w l o w 8
Nepal high medium low low 5
Averageh i ghm e d i u ml o w l o w 1
Cambodia medium low low low 14
Laos highh i ghh i ghh i gh1
Thailand medium low low low 10
Viet Nam high high low low 6
Averageh i ghh i ghm e d i u ml o w 2
Bolivia low low low low 18
Ecuador high medium medium low 4
Peru high high high high 2
Averagel o w l o w l o w l o w 4
Total medium low low low  
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Table 7:   Estimated performance of pigmeat production, 1994-2003 
η = 0 η = 0.5 η = 0.75 η = 1 Rank
Ethiopia medium low low low 10
Kenya high high high high 3
Sudan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tanzania high low low low 9
Uganda medium low low low 13
Averageh i gh low low low 3
Burkina Faso highm e d i u ml o w l o w 8
Mali low low low low 16
Senegal highh i ghh i ghh i gh1
Averageh i ghh i ghm e d i u ml o w 2
Bangladesh n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
India low low low low 15
Nepal high high medium low 6
Average medium low low low 5
Cambodia high low low low 12
Laos medium low low low 14
Thailand high high medium medium 5
Viet Nam high high medium low 7
Averageh i gh low low low 4
Bolivia high high high high 4
Ecuador high high high high 2
Peru low low low low 11
Averageh i ghh i ghh i ghm e d i u m 1
Total high medium low low  
 
Table 8:  Estimated performance of sheep and goats production, 1994-2003 
η = 0 η = 0.5 η = 0.75 η = 1 Rank
Ethiopia l o wl o wl o wl o w 1 3
Kenya low low low low 6
Sudan medium low low low 15
Tanzania low low low low 12
Uganda medium low low low 14
Averagel o w l o w l o w l o w 5
Burkina Faso medium low low low 10
Mali highh i ghl o wl o w 5
Senegal medium low low low 11
Averageh i gh low low low 4
Bangladesh high low low low 9
India low low low low 16
Nepal medium low low low 7
Average medium low low low 3
Cambodia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Laos highh i ghm e d i u ml o w 3
Thailand low low low low 17
Viet Nam high medium low low 8
Averageh i gh low low low 2
Bolivia medium low low low 4
Ecuador high medium medium low 2
Peru high high high high 1
Averageh i ghh i gh medium medium 1
Total high low low low  3. The Livestock Sector and Poverty in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
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The ambiguous and mostly poor performance of livestock production in all case study 
countries, with production growth rate mostly declining between 1984-1993 and 1994-
2003, suggests that the demand curve of livestock products shifted faster than supply.  
Indigenous livestock production, in fact, has not been able to keep pace with national 
meat/milk demand, and even with population growth in several cases, indicating that 
over the last twenty years policy makers have not designed and/or implemented 
successful policies to promote the long-term development of the livestock sector.   
Whether the current shifts in policy making, with poverty high on the political agendas 
of most developing countries, will reverse this trend and take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by the livestock revolution to reduce poverty level is examined 
in the following sections. 
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4. LIVESTOCK VERSUS LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS IN THE POLICY 
AGENDAS 
At the end of the 1990s, following much disillusionment with the poverty reducing 
effects of stabilization and structural adjustment programs, most countries posed 
poverty reduction at the centre of their development agenda.  Perhaps, the most 
powerful manifestations of the commitment to poverty reduction are the Millennium 
Declaration passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2000 and the 
growing number of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).  PRSPs are allegedly 
participatory development strategies aimed at fostering pro-poor economic growth 
(referred to as equitable, equity-based or broad-based) through a combination of core 
policies which typically include sound macroeconomic management, institutional 
reforms and a focus on increased social sector spending.  PRSPs are expected to 
identify the priority public actions over a three year horizon, including a table 
summarizing the overall public expenditure program and its allocation among key 
areas.  Hence, livestock inclusion/non inclusion in the PRSPs, and in the national 
policy documents in general, matters.  Table 9 compares the potential effectiveness 
of pro-poor livestock policies (see table A3) with the relevance given to livestock in 
the national development strategies, and shows whether decision-makers have 
designed a strategy specifically targeted to livestock development.  
Table 9:  Livestock in national policies 
Country
Potential efficacy of pro-
poor livestock policies




  Ethiopia high high no
  Kenya high medium yes
  Sudan high high yes
  Tanzania high low no
  Uganda high medium yes
East Africa
  Burkina Faso high high yes
  Mali high high no
  Senegal high medium no
West Africa
  Bangladesh medium low yes
  India medium high yes
  Nepal medium low no
South Asia
  Cambodia medium medium no
  Laos medium medium no
  Thailand medium low no
  Viet Nam medium medium no
Southeast Asia
  Bolivia low low no
  Ecuador medium low no
  Peru medium low no
Latin America  
 
Most national policy documents in the case study countries weakly appreciate the 
prospective contribution of livestock to economic development: there is no any clear 
correlation between the poverty reduction potentials of livestock, the role of the 
sector in the national development plans, and the endorsement of a livestock 
development strategy.  Only four African countries and India have highly emphasized 4. Livestock Versus Livestock Producers in the Policy Agendas 
17 
the relevance of livestock in the economy, with all others making modest (￿medium￿) 
or marginal (￿low￿) reference to the livestock sector. 
Box 1:  The role of livestock in national policy documents 
[...] It is of paramount importance to integrate the supply of drinking 
water and that of pasture so as to accelerate and improve animal 
resources development in these regions [arid and semi-arid]. In order to 
increase and improve pasture, the first priority task in those areas is to 
improve the supply of water both for humans and animals. [...] In 
pastoral areas, the need for the development of institutions which 
administer pasture lands among pastoral communities without violating 
indigenous long standing community (norms) is of paramount 
importance.... [and in crop-livestock production systems] although 
animal resource development should not be overlooked, the 
comparative advantage of these areas lies in crop production and feed 
generation for livestock systems (Ethiopia, Federal Democratic Republic 
of, 2002, p.57-58). 
 
[...] the livestock action plan aims to protect traditional stock raising 
and enhance its productivity in order to increase the income of 
traditional livestock breeders; encourage and intensify the development 
of modern livestock sector so that the sector can attract new players 
and create jobs; and intensify the entire set of actions aimed at 
enhancing the contribution of the sector to the balance of payments, 
augmenting added value and increasing food security (Burkina Faso, 
Republic of, 2000, no page). 
 
...animal husbandry and dairying will receive high priority in the efforts 
for generating wealth and employment, increasing the availability of 
animal protein in the food basket and for generating exportable 
surpluses. The overall focus will be on four broad pillars viz. (i) 
removing policy distortions that are hindering the natural growth of 
livestock production; (ii) building participatory institutions of collective 
action for small-scale farmers that allow them to get vertically 
integrated with livestock processors and input suppliers; (iii) creating 
an environment in which farmers will increase investment in ways that 
will improve productivity in the livestock sector; and (iv) promoting 
effective regulatory institutions to deal with the threat of 
environmental and health crises stemming from livestock (India, 
Planning Commission, 2002, p.570). 
 
The Cambodian PRSP (2002) promotes the  ...expansion of livestock 
production with emphasis on animal health services, nutrition and range 
management and establishment of meat processing plants (Cambodia, 
Kingdom of, 2002, p.55). 
 
[...] the main causes of poverty are (in order of importance): (i) 
problems associated with land; (ii) livestock loss because of lack of 
veterinary services [and accordingly the government plans to] 
strengthen the animal health control system and livestock extension 
system (Lao People￿s Democratic Republic, 2004, p.36 and p.61).  
 
The livestock sector [...] has a high growth potential and is of priority 
importance for subsistence farmers and pastoralists. The government 
plans to implement a concerted strategy for disease outbreak 
prevention and control, and improving quality and certification of 4. Livestock Versus Livestock Producers in the Policy Agendas 
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veterinarians and other service providers. (Kenya, Republic of, 2004, 
p.57). 
 
[...] the intention is to set up specific lines of credit for development of 
the different sub-sectors in order to encourage greater involvement by 
the private sector; steps will be taken to improve marketing channels; 
livestock services will be properly equipped to enable them to perform 
their health control and inspection functions properly (Senegal, 
Republic of, 2002, pp.30-31). 
 
[...] any strategy for addressing food security must involve actions to 
improve agricultural and livestock production and farm incomes to 
ensure availability and access to food (Tanzania, the United Republic 
of, 2000, p.26).  
 
[...] the growth strategies for agriculture are to modernize, diversify 
and commercialize crop and livestock production by expanding the use 
of technology, and increasing the access of farmers to modern 
agricultural inputs and credit. Similarly, promoting the participation of 
private sector and NGOs/INGOs in service delivery, market promotion 
and infrastructure development are other major strategies (Nepal, 
Kingdom of, 2003, p.45). 
 
[...]  forestry, fisheries and livestock sub-sectors have high potential to 
accelerate growth and create employment, including social 
development multipliers (Bangladesh, People￿s Republic of, 2003, no 
page). 
 
[...] investment in production infrastructure also includes basic and 
small-scale infrastructure relating to agricultural needs and marketing 
needs of this sector. Such projects include: collection centers, storage 
centers, silos, greenhouses, and livestock infrastructure (including 
livestock dips, stables, corrals, milking modules, and artisanal 
workshops) (Bolivia, Republic of, 2001, p. 64). 
 
In Ethiopia, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Mali, animal rearing is a widespread and 
customary economic activity, while India has a long tradition of economic planning, 
with the first Five-Year Plan (1951-1956) already devoting a chapter to livestock.  It is 
thus hardly unexpected that the national planning documents of these countries 
extensively deal with livestock.  These documented strategies, however, (i) lack a 
vision for the present and prospected role of livestock in the economy; e.g. what is 
the role of livestock in the rural economy? What its contribution to environment 
protection? What the expected changes in meat/milk demand and how they will be 
accommodated?  (ii) They primarily focus on livestock production and productivity, 
and do not adequately investigate the relation between enhanced production and 
poverty reduction: poverty is examined in an autonomous and independent section in 
all documents and the peculiar role of livestock in the portfolio activities of poor 
households, such as its social and insurance value, is not investigated. 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Mali and India are the exception.  Most national policy 
documents have either identified a shopping list of actions for livestock development, 
such as the majority of Asian economies, or neglected to address specific constraints 
to sector growth, such as the three Andean countries.  The Kenyan, Ugandan, 
Senegalese, Cambodian, Laotian and Vietnamese national development strategies 
refer to livestock in few paragraphs, and present a piecemeal approach to sector 
development.  These strategies fail to appreciate the specificities of smallholder 4. Livestock Versus Livestock Producers in the Policy Agendas 
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technologies/constraints, and restrict their focus primarily on animal health, 
particularly emphasizing the role of private sector in extension services.  The national 
policy documents of the remaining case-study countries, i.e. Tanzania, Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Thailand, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, either mention the livestock sub-sector in-
passing or treat it as and undifferentiated component of the agricultural/crop sector.  
Agriculture, however, is not a good proxy for livestock, which present idiosyncratic 
features that call for specific public actions.  Bangladesh is an unusual case: despite 
the livestock sector is not significantly mentioned in the PRSP, an animal sector policy 
paper is under preparation, with a focus on mixed crop-livestock production systems. 
While policy documents can be differentiated according to the relevance given to 
livestock, they share, with the partial exception of Ethiopia, two underlying common 
ingredients.  They marginally analyse poverty (e.g. 3 pages over 152 in the Kenyan 
PRSP, 20/253 in the Cambodian PRSP; 12/131 in the Nepalese PRSP; 7/146 in the 
Malian PRSP; 10/224 in the Bolivian PRSP) and treat in different sections sector 
development strategies and poverty reduction.  In the case of livestock, the policy 
documents, explicitly or implicitly, identify increased production as the overall 
development objective for the sector, rather than reducing poverty through livestock 
production.  The policy entry point into the sector is thus the animal / livestock 
commodity and not the household.  For example, the aim of improving veterinary 
services is to reduce animal diseases and, hence, improve production; it is not to 
increase the income of the poor.  Processing facilities are to be developed for fresh 
meat and whole milk, not for the poor milk/meat producers.  Sanitary standards have 
to satisfy export market requirements, not the needs of the poor livestock keepers 
and consumers.  Livestock holders, however, are an extremely heterogeneous group 
and, being often extremely poor, do not always maximize a production function, such 
as all national policy documents assume.  Their production and consumption decisions, 
in fact, are ￿non-separable￿, and livestock are a factor of production, a ￿consumption￿ 
good, and a form of saving and insurance.  For instance, in arid and semi-arid zones 
livestock are the major source of wealth and income for pastoralists, but also a risk 
coping device in response to exogenous shocks.  In rainfed and irrigated mixed 
production systems, livestock contribution to household income is less, but again 
animals not only provide food for home-consumption and market but also contribute 
to social status, are source of manure, draft power and hauling services, a buffer to 
risk and a form of savings (Imai, 2004; Mortimore, 1991; Wilson et al., 1995; 
Kristjanson et al., 2004). 
While the national policy documents were not expected to take into full account the 
heterogeneity of livestock producers and the multiple roles that livestock play in the 
household, a broader disaggregation of the poor, a deeper analysis of their 
behavioural patterns, and a focus on household rather than on the production 
technology tout-court, would have facilitated the design of pro-poor policies, and pro-
poor livestock policies in particular.  Existing policies, in fact, as the following 
sections will show, fail to adequately address the most binding constraints preventing 
poor smallholders from taking advantages of growing livestock demand. 
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5. THE MACRO FRAMEWORK FOR POVERTY REDUCTION 
5.1  Beyond macroeconomic stability 
The determinants of the living standard of (the poor) livestock holders are due to the 
interplay of macro, meso, institutional and micro policies.  At the micro level, prices 
and wages are typically exogenous, while they are endogenous at the macro level, as 
they depend on the interaction between aggregate supply and demand.  The degrees 
of freedom of agricultural sector and livestock policies, therefore, are delimited by 
the current macroeconomic and institutional thrusts, which are outlined in the 
national policy documents. 
Governments in the countries examined aim at reducing poverty in line with the 
Millennium Development Goals, and target GDP growth rates at between 4 to 8 
percent per year
6 (e.g. 5.7% in Ethiopia; 6% in Tanzania; 7% in Uganda; 4-5% in Burkina 
Faso; 5% in Thailand; 5% in Ecuador; 6-7% in Cambodia; 7-8% in India).  The core and 
common macro policy instruments identified to sustain economic growth and reduce 
poverty level are macroeconomic stability, investments in public goods and 
institutional reforms. 
 
The overreaching objective of the government’s poverty reduction strategy is to reduce 
poverty through enhancing rapid economic growth while at the same time maintaining 
macroeconomic stability (Ethiopia, Federal Democratic Republic of, 2002, p.42). 
 
... the design of all public expenditure by a clear analysis of the link between inputs, 
outputs and outcomes, in a framework which ensures consistency of sectoral expenditure 
levels with the overall resource constraint in order to ensure macroeconomic stability and 
to maximise the efficiency of public expenditure in attaining predetermined outcomes 
(Uganda, Republic of, 2000). 
 
Macroeconomic stability results when key economic relationships are in balance (e.g. 
example fiscal revenues and expenditure, savings and investments, the balance of 
payments).  Cross-country regressions have found that stability is a major prerequisite 
to economic development: high and unpredictable inflation, a large black market 
exchange premium, real exchange rate appreciation, large government deficits and 
poorly developed financial systems are all significantly associated with slow growth 
(Easterly and Levine, 1995; Ojo and Oshikoya, 1995).  The causal links between 
macroeconomic stability and poverty reduction, however, are not fully understood.  
On the one hand, most indicators of well-being are positively associated with 
macroeconomic stability; on the other hand, cross-country regressions on the relation 
between individual macroeconomic policies and changes in the Human Development 
Index (HDI) indicate that only low inflation (below 40 percent/year) is significantly 
                                                 
6 Economic growth is by far the most important factor influencing poverty reduction. Dollar and Kraay (2002) analysed 
growth and poverty patterns in 80 countries over 40 years and concluded that, on average, economic growth is neutral with 
respect to income distribution, namely tha t  g r o w t h  i s  a s  g o o d  f o r  t h e  p o o r  a s  i t  i s  f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  e c o n o m y ,  w i t h  n o  
differences between developing and industrialized countries.  White and Anderson (2001) decomposed the growth of the 
poor￿s income into a growth and a redistribution effect; they then examined 143 growth episodes in 20 countries and found 
that the growth effect dominates in almost three-quarter of cases. 5. The Macro Framework for Poverty Reduction 
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correlated with poverty reduction
7 (Cashin et  al., 2003; McKinley, 2003; Stiglitz, 
1998). 
Macroeconomic stability is relevant for livestock development, indirectly, through 
economic growth as in low-income countries the demand for food of animal origin is 
elastic with respect to income, and directly, because the sub-sector involves assets 
that are both production inputs and can be stored for value; an unstable 
macroeconomic environment may induce people to keep livestock as a risk hedge 
activity and not making efficient use of their production potentials (Williams et al., 
1995). 






































































Source: elaborated from FAOSTAT (2004) and World Bank (2004b) 
 
Most sample countries have gone through one or more programs of stabilization and 
structural adjustment over the last two decades and boast a certain degree of 
stability these days.  Between 1984 and 2003 GDP annual growth rate averaged over 4 
percent, rising up from 3.5 percent in 1984-1993 to 4.7 percent in 1994-2003 (table 
A2).  Inflation and price variability stay low, with only Ethiopia and Lao recording a 
two-digit inflation in 2003; central government deficits range between 1 to 7 percent 
of GDP, in spite of foreign aid significantly contributing to government budget: 34 
percent in Bolivia (2001), 38 percent in Nepal (2002), 16 percent in Vietnam (2002), 21 
percent in Bangladesh (1999), 41 percent in Senegal (2001), 65 percent in Uganda 
(2001).  These deficits are often larger than those of high-income countries, but not 
necessarily deleterious for the economy as their viability depends on circumstances, 
including the cyclical states of the economy and prospects for future growth.  Deficits 
are associated with government expenditures averaging 16 to 22 percent of GDP and 
                                                 
7 High inflation severely impacts on poverty level and the livelihoods of livestock holders, directly through a decline in real 
wage rates, owing to short-run rigidities of nominal wages, and indirectly as the poor mostly hold savings, if any, in the form 
of cash rather than assets and inflation reduces the real values of such savings.  Of course, if the poor are indebted, inflation 
reduces the real cost of their debt, but poor livestock holders are typically rationed in the credit market.  Even though the 
literature shows that below the threshold of 40 percent per year inflation is not costly in terms of growth, inflation targets 
are often single digit and achieved by means of large raises in interest rates.  Pasha and Palanivel (2004) and Stiglitz (1998) 
even maintain that at low level of inflation there is room for expansionary fiscal policy. 5. The Macro Framework for Poverty Reduction 
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fiscal revenues being around 8.8 to 15 percent of GDP.  The balance of payments is 
negative in most countries, with current account deficits at 5 to 10 percent of GDP in 
African countries, and 0.5 to 4 percent in the other geographical regions.  Government 
debts range between 9 to over 100 percent of GDP, and have been increasing since 
the mid 1980s, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of gross domestic 
production.  Most countries could thus enter into debt-servicing difficulties, which are 
significantly associated with debts above 40-45 percent of GDP (IMF, 2004; World 
Bank, 2004b). 
Countries have made significant progress towards achieving macroeconomic stability 
in recent years, but some further efforts should be made.  However, there is today 
agreement that strategies primarily centred on macroeconomic efficiency and the 
associated growth are likely to weakly mitigate against poverty.  Current national 
policy documents, therefore, not only focus on macroeconomic stability, such as old-
style stabilization and structural adjustment packages, but also on ways to promote 
pro-poor economic growth, which is growth that effectively reduces poverty level.   
Particular emphasis has been given to investments in infrastructure, education, and 
basic social services in general. 
 
... (i) provide free education ... for all girls and for those boys of oppressed, backward 
and below poverty line communities; (ii) provide education in mother languages (of 
communities) up to the primary level; (iii) regulate fees in private schools; (iv) provide 
scholarship in private/boarding schools to students from ‘oppressed and backward 
communities’ and (v) set up Rural Education Development Fund which would be utilized 
for funding the education of marginalized communities (Nepal, Kingdom of, 2003, p.20). 
 
The establishment of basic infrastructures that are better in terms of quality and 
geographic distribution, together with availability of essential social services are 
prerequisites for strengthening the stock of human capital and offering viable solutions to 
the social demands through appropriate investment, particularly in the fields of 
education, health, hydraulic engineering and transport (Bolivia, Republic of, 2001, p. 41). 
 
Such investments are essential as the poor need the skills to raise their productivity, 
and the infrastructural facilities to access input and output markets; at the same 
time, most countries, particularly in Africa, have so far under-invested in public goods 
benefiting the poor, preventing them from taking advantage of growing market 
opportunities.  As examples, educational policies and infrastructural networks are 
briefly examined. 
de Janvry and Sadoulet (2001) show that extensive secondary education is necessary 
for economic growth to mitigate against poverty.
8  In the case study countries the 
secondary gross enrolment ratio is particularly low, averaging 14.2 and 20.3 percent in 
West and East Africa, 46.4 and 53.8 percent in South and Southeast Asia, and over 75 
percent only in the three Andean countries.
9  The available evidence, furthermore, 
suggests that public expenditure in education has been often biased against the poor.  
The ratio of government spending (as % of GDP) per student on primary to tertiary 
education, which is a proxy of inequality in public investment across the income 
percentiles, indicates that in East and West Africa a primary student receives 1.7 to 
                                                 
8 For example, trade liberalization, which is positively associated with economic growth (World Bank, 2003a), should allow 
developing countries to specialize in labour-intensive products, which will eventually bid up the price of labour.  Capital 
labour substitution will start to occur, but will be possible only if the government has subsidised education and training so as 
to complement capital formation with a sufficient supply of skilled labour. 
9 The secondary gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group 
that officially corresponds to the secondary level of education. 5. The Macro Framework for Poverty Reduction 
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4.8 percent of what a university student does; these percentages are 16.9 to 29.0 in 
Asian and Latin American countries (World Bank, 2004b). 
Poor smallholders not only are weakly educated, but also face high transaction costs 
because of the low density of road networks and other communication links in rural 
areas.  The African and Latin American case-study countries have road networks to an 
average density of 4.5 to 8.7 kilometres of roads per 100 square kilometre of land 
area, compared to 14.5 to 93.4 in Southeast and South Asian countries; many roads in 
rural areas are even impracticable during the rainy season and, in Africa, only around 
14 percent of the existing roads are paved (World Bank, 2004b).  This is a consequence 
of land abundance and low population density.  In such a setting, in fact, the 
opportunity cost of investing in rural infrastructure is particularly high, as per-capita 
public investment is higher than in densely populated areas and roads have lower 
utilization rates; on the other hand, smallholders are isolated, poor and uneducated 
and, therefore, not able to express their demands at the policy level in spite of 
accounting for a large share of votes (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997; Platteau and 
Hayami, 1998).  Transaction costs are therefore higher in Africa and Latin America 
than in Asia.  A comparative study of vertical and spatial price transmissions in sixteen 
countries worldwide concludes that African countries tend to show lower degrees of 
price transmissions compared to Asian and Latin America countries.  It argues that 
physical barriers, infrastructural deficiencies, as well as the limited size of markets, 
are likely to be the main determinants of this gap (Conforti, 2004). 
The above examples not only support the view of the national policy documents that 
increasingly pro-poor public investments are needed to benefit the poor (livestock 
keepers), but also bring to light the weakness of the institutional infrastructure of the 
countries analyzed and the implicit influence of interest groups politics in decision-
making.  There are, in fact, economic (efficiency) and political economy reasons 
indicating that (high-quality) governments should have invested into the poor.  (i) The 
poorer a country, the poorer the median voter; hence, if democracy is at work, the 
poorer the country, the more pro-poor redistributive policies should be in place (such 
as investment in primary education).  (ii) An increase in one person￿s income affects 
social welfare by both increasing total GDP and changing inequality; as inequality 
negatively affects national welfare and GDP growth, the first best option would be if 
the extra-income goes to a person below the mean/median income.  (iii) Even if the 
welfare of the poor is not given extra-weight, investments into the poor are likely to 
be the most effective way to raise average income; it is a standard tenet of economic 
theory that raising real average incomes requires closing gaps between private and 
social costs, and these gaps are prevalent among the poor who often confront with 
imperfect and incomplete markets.  (iv) The popular capabilities-oriented approach to 
human development, by which development is seen as a process of expanding the 
choices that people have, suggests prioritising poverty reduction strategies, as the 
capabilities set of the poor is severely limited (Addison and Rahman, 2001; Rodrik, 
2000a). 
5.2  Exogenous versus endogenous institutions 
Institutional reforms, namely civil sector downsizing, anti-corruption policies, 
decentralization of services and improved regulations, are high on the political 
agendas in the countries examined, and in the medium to long-term are expected to 
favour the implementation of pro-poor policies: 
 
... the administration is ill-equipped and insufficiently skilled to design and implement 
public policies, so as to adequately take into account the main concerns of citizens, and 
thereby ensure its legitimacy and social effectiveness ... Mali is pinning much hope on the 5. The Macro Framework for Poverty Reduction 
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current policy of decentralization in the fight against poverty, by promoting local 
democracy, the conscious involvement of the people in the exercising power and in the 
development through management of decentralized ‘collectivites territoriales’ (Mali, 
Republic of, 2002, p. 21-22). 
 
... the government’s policy document on governance issues provides a comprehensive 
approach for improving public sector management, and has been fully integrated into the 
National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy (NGPES). Sound governance is essential 
to achieving a stable ad open society, where the rights of the people are guaranteed by 
an efficient administration of the law (Lao People￿s Democratic Republic, 2004, p. 47). 
 
Table 10 attempts to capture the quality of the institutional infrastructure in African, 
Asian and Latin American countries, reflecting the way institutions are dealt within 
the national policy documents.  These consider institutions as the (prominent) 
organizational establishments, such as government agencies and cooperatives, and as 
the rules of the game as distinct from the players, such as laws and regulations. 
The second column of table 10 displays a proxy variable for institutional quality built 
as an equal-weighted average of five ordinal governance indicators produced by 
Kaufmann et al. (2003), and normalized to have zero mean (at world level) and scores 
between -2.5 and +2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.  The 
underlying indicators are ￿voice and accountability￿, ￿political stability￿, ￿government 
effectiveness￿, ￿rule of law￿ and ￿control of corruption￿.  Voice and accountability 
measures the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the selection of 
government; political stability assesses the likelihood the ruling government will be 
overthrown through unconstitutional (violent) means; government effectiveness 
measures the quality of public service provisions and the credibility of government 
policies; rule of law assesses the extent to which economic agents have confidence 
and abide to the rules of the society; control of corruption measures the perceptions 
of corruption by ordinary citizens.  The equal-weighted average of these indicators 
intends to assess the quality of governance, that is the quality of the decision-making 
process and the quality of the process by which decisions are implemented.   5. The Macro Framework for Poverty Reduction 
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Table 10:  Institutional indicators for selected countries 











Cost (% of 
debt)
Ethiopia -0.80 7 32 77.4 30 420 14.8
Kenya -0.88 12 47 53.4 25 360 41.3
Sudan -1.44 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tanzania -0.53 13 35 186.9 21 242 35.3
Uganda -0.88 17 36 131.3 15 209 22.3
Average -0.91 12.3 37.5 112.3 22.8 307.8 28.4
Burkina Faso -0.33 13 135 152.8 41 458 92.5
Mali -0.32 13 42 187.4 28 340 34.6
Senegal -0.15 9 57 112.9 36 485 23.8
Average -0.27 11.7 78.0 151.0 35.0 427.7 50.3
Bangladesh -0.72 8 35 91 29 365 21.3
India -0.15 11 89 49.5 40 425 43.1
Nepal -0.69 7 21 74.1 28 350 25.8
Average -0.52 8.7 48.3 71.5 32.3 380.0 30.1
Cambodia -0.63 11 94 480.1 31 401 121.3
Laos -0.99 9 198 18.5 53 443 30.3
Thailand 0.23 8 33 6.7 26 390 13.4
Viet Nam -0.44 11 56 28.6 37 404 30.1
Average -0.46 9.8 95.3 133.5 36.8 409.5 48.8
Bolivia -0.43 15 59 173.9 47 591 10.6
Ecuador -0.67 14 92 47.4 41 388 15.3
Peru -0.31 10 98 36.4 35 441 34.7
Average -0.47 13.0 83.0 85.9 41.0 473.3 20.2
OECD countries n.a. 6.0 25.0 8.0 19.0 229.0 10.7
*equal weighted average of ’voice and accountability’, ’political stability’, ’government effectiveness’, ’rule of law’ and ’control of corruption’
Starting a business Enforcing a contract
Country
 
Source: elaborated from Kaufman et al. (2003) and Djankov et al. (2002, 2003). 
 
The quality of governance is below the world average in all countries analysed, with 
the exception of Thailand.  Sudan, Laos, Kenya and Uganda present the lowest scores 
in the institutional index; Thailand, India, Senegal and Peru boast the highest scores.  
At aggregate level, West Africa study countries (Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal) make 
up the geographical region with the best governance architecture, followed by 
Southeast Asia and Latin America study countries; East Africa case study countries 
record the lowest level of institutional quality. 
The right hand side of table 10 looks at the second institutional dimension examined 
in the national policy documents, and intends to capture the extent to which rules 
and regulations support market functioning and private initiatives.  Markets, in fact, 
are only apparently institution-free and necessitate a number of ex-ante rules to 
function properly.  For example, secure and legally recognized property rights and 
enforceability of contracts are essential for economic agents to enter into an 
agreement and benefit from market exchanges.  The government, therefore, is 
supposed to protect property rights and ensure that all parties comply with their 
market obligations.  At the same time, while rules are necessary, the state should 
avoid making it unprofitable for private economic agents to act in the market.  For 
instance, bureaucratic barriers that hinder licensing of businesses and expensive 
labour legislation may create high ￿costs of formality￿ that discourage investment.  De 
Soto (1986) shows that, in Peru, small informal firms are often more productive than 
large ones, which cannot escape the regulatory control (e.g. taxes, fees) of the state.  
Furthermore, the informal economy is restricted in its growth and productivity as, as 
it grows, it attracts the attention of regulators potentially undercutting its 
profitability. 5. The Macro Framework for Poverty Reduction 
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Following Djankov et al. (2002 and 2003), table 10 considers variables measuring the 
bureaucratic and legal procedures required to incorporate and register a new 
commercial or industrial firm; stricter regulation of entry into business, in fact, is 
associated with higher level of corruption and a greater relative size of the informal 
economy, rather than high quality products (Djankov et al., 2002); it also displays 
indicators measuring the legal procedures to enforce a contract, namely to collect an 
overdue debt, as higher procedural formalism in dispute resolution is associated, 
ceteris paribus, with lower honesty, consistency, fairness and higher level of 
corruption (Djankov at al., 2003). 
The number of procedures and the time it takes to start up a simple business varies 
from the low of 7 in Ethiopia and Nepal to the high of 17 in Uganda; the minimum 
official time varies from 21 days in Nepal to 198 days in Laos; the official cost of 
following these procedures ranges from 6.7 percent of per capita GDP in Thailand to 
480.1 percent in Cambodia.
10  The number of procedures required to pursue wither 
claim to courts are extraordinarily lengthy in the case-study countries, with no 
relevant exception.  Collecting an overdue debt requires a minimum of 15 procedures 
in Uganda to up to 53 in Laos; it takes a minimum of 209 days in Uganda to a 
maximum of 591 days in Bolivia; it costs a minimum of 10.6 percent of debt in Bolivia 
to a maximum of 121.3 percent (!) in Cambodia. 
The market mechanism appears to be poorly sustained in the countries examined, 
both because of the low quality of government institutions and because public 
authorities often support red-tape development instruments which pose constraints to 
private initiatives.  In other words, if market reforms are undertaken, a thriving and 
efficient private sector will find it difficult to develop and engage in the functions 
previously performed by parastatals.  The emphasis on institutional reforms in the 
national policy documents is thus highly motivated.  However, on the one hand, how 
much time it will take for countries to have a pro-poor institutional environment has 
no clear answer; on the other hand, national planning documents fail to consider the 
endogeneity of institutions.  Institutions, in fact, are not established by a deus-ex-
machina but are the outcomes of the interaction between economic agents, market 
imperfections, relative prices and the current rules of the game (Aoki, 2001).  As 
suggested by Demsetz (1967), they develop to internalise externalities when the gains 
of internalisation become larger than the cost of internalisation, and include both 
formal laws and authorities, and informal and illegal behaviours and contracts.
11  In 
other words, changing rules and regulations do not necessarily lead to better 
outcomes unless the underlying structural constraints are adequately addressed.  For 
example, land titling programs in Africa have often conflicted with customary tenure 
rights which are considered the most efficient in arid and semi-arid zones (El-
Ghonemy, 2002); the decentralization process, which is on going in most countries, is 
expected to enhance the accountability of local authorities and lead to more effective 
policies; however, in areas of high economic inequality it may provide incentives for 
the local elite to perform collective actions and ￿capture￿ local government agencies 
(Bardhan and Gathak, 1999). 
                                                 
10 These figures assume that there are no delays by either the applicant or the regulators in the procedures.  De Soto (2000) 
and his colleagues opened a small business in Lima: it took them 289 days having the business legally registered, with a cost 
amounting to 31 times the average monthly wage.  In 6 years and 11 months they obtained a legal authorization to build a 
house and went through 728 administrative steps to obtain a legal title for the land they built in. 
11 The most quoted example of the endogeneity of institutions is by Ester Boserup (1965) in her seminal book on ￿The 
Conditions of Agricultural Growth￿, where she argues that population growth increases the land/labour price ratio leading 
customary tenure rights to evolve towards alienable (private) individual land rights.  Sharecropping contracts can be thought 
as a risk-coping device and a substitute for financial institutions in case of imperfections in intertemporal markets (Laffont 
and Matoussi, 1995).  Populations located in drought-prone zones tend to adopt property rights rules securing access to all 
members, and institutional structures that are less hierarchical than those where the environmental conditions are less prone 
to natural hazards (Nugent and Sanchez, 1999); with high risk of drought and variability of rainfall, in fact, the extremely 
high transaction costs of protecting scattered private property plots make it optimal for livestock keepers to be highly mobile 
and have common access to as many different grazing areas as possible. 5. The Macro Framework for Poverty Reduction 
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As emphasized by Rodrik (2000b), the question before decision-makers is no longer ￿do 
institutions matter?￿ but ￿which institutions matter and how does one acquire them?￿  
He indicates two possible approaches: ￿technology transfer￿, which means importing a 
blueprint from more advanced economies or dominant development narratives; and 
￿local-knowledge acquisition￿, which aggregates local information to the needs of the 
society in question.  Both these approaches can be effective if based on the existence 
of ￿participatory political institutions￿, i.e. meta-institutions that elicit and aggregate 
knowledge to facilitate building endogenous institutions which deliver pro-poor 
growth.  Participatory development approaches and the endogeneity of institutions, 
however, are mainly neglected by the current policy documents which tend to adopt a 




6. PRO-POOR AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK SECTOR POLICIES  
The current macroeconomic and institutional policies appear to be pro-poor despite a 
number of shortcomings, such as the deficient analysis of poverty and the household 
economy in the national policy documents.  In any case, the economic growth ensuing 
from macroeconomic stability and increased institutional efficiency should provide 
opportunities for livestock holders to escape out of poverty.  Market imperfections, 
however, loom large in rural areas and need to be addressed by agricultural and 
livestock sub-sector policies to have the poor livestock holders benefiting from 
opportunities offered by an efficient macro environment.  Table 11 presents some 
preliminary indications of the variety of physical and developmental constraints that 
affect livestock keepers according to agro-ecological zones.
12  There exists a variety of 
complementarity policies that can be designed to address these constraints and 
facilitate rural dwellers coming out of poverty.  While there are bright spots in every 
respect (e.g. credit policies; land policies), the real challenge is to have a coherent 
and comprehensive sector policy framework which consistently addresses all 
constraints locking livestock holders into poverty traps.  Agricultural and livestock 
sub-sector policies in the case-study countries will be examined according to the 
three-level framework developed in section 2 (see table 1), which includes: 
￿establishing the basics for smallholder livestock production￿, ￿kick starting domestic 
livestock markets￿, and ￿supporting the expansion of livestock markets￿.  Readers 
should be aware that what follows examines paper policies, which are not necessarily 
implemented by the responsible authorities. 
 
                                                 
12 For example, livestock keepers in pastoral areas have lower access to markets compared to smallholders in irrigated 
farming systems; it follows that price changes due to market liberalization will induce smallholders in irrigated areas to 
reallocate their productive resources according to price signals; but they will marginally affect pastoralists￿ production 
decisions, unless specific public actions are taken.  Smallholders in rainfed farming systems are confronted with interlocked 
factor markets; for instance, imperfect land markets prevent financial institutions from extending loans according to 
efficiency criteria; it follows that reforming credit institutions without considering the way the land market works may prove 
ineffective. 6. Pro-poor Agricultural and Livestock Sector Policies 
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6.1  Establishing the basics for smallholder livestock production
13 
6.1.1  Access to land, feed and water 
Insecure access to land, water and feed and exposure to natural hazards are 
prominent constraints for small farmers in rainfed crop-livestock production systems 
and pastoralists.  In mixed rainfed production systems, secure and long-term access to 
land provides the first best incentives for resource allocation, as smallholders are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of their efforts.  In particular, it enhances opportunities to use 
resources (as family labour) that in many cases are underused (Deininger, 2001); it 
allows farmers to transact in markets where land can be used as collateral (Banjeree 
and Newman, 1994); it encourages lump-sum investments in both physical and human 
capital (Deininger et al., 2000); it has positive effects on nutrition level, both through 
enhanced income and direct access to calories intake (Burgess, 2000); and it protects 
against calamity, making it less severe exogenous shocks of nature (Berry, 1998).  Arid 
and semi-arid pastoral areas are marked by long cycles of drought and post-drought 
recovery, with recurring forage scarcity for livestock buffered through cycles in animal 
weight and productivity changes.  Pastoralists are thus characterized by low level and 
high variability of income, and often pursue a survival strategy rather than maximizing 
profit.  Secure access to (common) natural resources so as to pool weather risks across 
different patches of rangelands is essential for their survival (Banks, 2003; Nugent and 
Sanchez, 1999; Kamara et al., 2004).   
Some sort of state intervention is needed for the land system to be pro-poor, as the 
market is not able to shift land to the resource poor.  The price of land, in fact, 
exceeds the present discounted value of the income flow that can be produced from 
farming, as it is inflated by credit subsidies, by fiscal policies allowing the use of 
agriculture as a tax shelter, by the social value of the land, and by macroeconomic 
instability that encourages the use of land as an inflation hedge.  Even in perfect 
market environments the resource poor cannot buy land because at equilibrium the 
income increment from a unit of land would be exactly equal to the unit interest to be 
paid back to the bank.  Individuals without accumulated savings, therefore, should 
have to reduce their consumption below subsistence level to make principal payments 
on the purchased land.  It follows that the relatively wealthy landowners are expected 
to be net buyers of land and the relatively small ones net sellers (Binswanger, 1987; 
Carter and Mesbah, 1993; Carter and Salgado, 2001). 
Land laws in the countries analyzed have been unable to establish an equitable and 
growth-supporting land tenure system so far.  In Africa, there is inadequate 
recognition of customary tenure by policy makers, lack of formal property titles, 
frequent inconsistencies between customary and formal laws, and conflicts between 
pastoralists and settled farmers.
14  In Asia and Latin America, a major concern is the 
large and increasing number of rural landless or near landless families, with skewer 
access to land in the Andean countries compared to South and Southeast Asia.  The 
current status of affairs not only is path-dependent on centuries of colonial 
dominations, but also on a number of ineffective land laws passed after 
independence.  For example, in Ethiopia, the land belongs to the State and cannot be 
sold or mortgaged, with potential negative consequences for the credit markets; in 
                                                 
13 Unless differently indicated, all information in sub-sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 is from FAO/PPLPI Livestock Sector Policy 
Briefs and the references therein. 
14 Several countries have been recording a shift from areas devoted to pastures towards crops: Jodha (1992) showed that, 
over the period 1951-1981, common property land declined between 31 and 55 percent in a number of Indian states; FAO 
(2002) estimated that in the next 30 years developing countries will need an additional 120 million hectares of land for crop 
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Kenya, most land has been titled with the exception of grazing areas, with growing 
competition and conflicts among expanding farmers and pastoralists; in Sudan, since 
1970 all land is formally in the hand of the State, which leases it to farmers and 
private entrepreneurs who have thus limited incentives to long-term investments; in 
Uganda, most farmers do not have registered land titles and the 1998 Land Act 
remains to be implemented; in Burkina Faso, the 1991 Agrarian Land Reorganization 
Law introduced for the first time the notion of private property rights, but land 
transactions are scanty and hampered by traditional customary tenure; finally, 
insecurity of tenure is widespread in Senegal and Mali, where land laws are still in 
their early implementation phase. 
In India, but for Kerala and West Bengal, State-initiated land reforms are considered 
to have been unsuccessful in getting land to the poor: landless agricultural labourers 
account for less than a third of all rural population but make up almost half of those 
living below the poverty line.  In Bangladesh, the Land Reform Ordinance, which 
governs contracts between landowner and sharecroppers, is often not applied; in 
Nepal, only in 2000 the government started developing a land cadastral system; in 
Laos, in 1991 land use rights were established for all individuals but have not been 
granted so far.  In Latin America, Bolivia presents a highly unequal distribution of 
land, with poor farmers accessing only fragmented small plots in the highlands; in 
1994, Ecuador endorsed a new agrarian law to equalize access to land, but results 
have been disappointing so far; in Peru, despite a widespread land titling program, a 
significant number of farmers have not yet been given a registered valid land property 
title. 
Although inadequate land tenure systems worldwide prevent smallholders from making 
efficient use of their scarce resources, most national policy documents treat access to 
land as a marginal issue.  For example, the Bolivian PRSP indicates that insecure and 
unequal access to land significantly hampers the development of rural areas; but the 
￿Matrix of Priority Actions and Policies for Promoting Rural Development￿ identifies 
only the ￿regularization of rural land ownership￿ as a priority area of intervention, de 
facto overlooking the distributional issue (Bolivia, Republic of, 2001).  In Uganda, only 
0.6 percent of the total expenditure of the Poverty Reduction Action Plan is allocated 
for the implementation of the Land Act, while 67 percent to primary education and 7 
percent to rural roads (Uganda, Republic of, 2000).  In Ethiopia, the government plans 
to ￿assist investors in large-scale commercial farms to have access to agricultural land 
with basic infrastructure￿, neglecting the needs of pastoral communities (Ethiopia, 
Federal Democratic Republic of, 2002, p. 108).  In Cambodia, ￿although more than 70 
percent of the [...] population are employed in agricultural production, between 12 
and 15 percent of them have no agricultural land￿; however, in the poverty-reduction 
priority actions matrix there is no any mention to the land issue (Cambodia, Kingdom 
of, 2002, pp. iii-iv).  In Tanzania, the PRSP policy matrix only refers to land suitable 
for irrigation, which is just around 3 percent of all agricultural land (Tanzania, United 
Republic of, 2000; FAOSTAT, 2004). 
6.1.2  Risk coping mechanisms 
A second basic developmental constraint for both pastoralists and farmers in mixed 
rainfed production systems is exposure to risks, including natural hazards, animal 
killer diseases, price volatility and human diseases.
15  Stability of production and 
prices, in fact, is a necessary condition for smallholders to efficiently allocate 
resources according to price signals and programme long-run investments.   
Conversely, in an unstable environment, prices only marginally drive resource 
                                                 
15 Investment in basic social services, including human health, is a cornerstone of the national policy documents (see 
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allocation and smallholders show a bias towards food production, use non-risky 
technologies, diversify their income sources towards off-farm incomes with low 
covariation with agricultural production, assume storage behaviour that accounts for 
food security considerations, and accumulate assets that can be easily transformed 
into cash (including livestock).  Response to risks can also rely on mutual credit and 
insurance for consumption smoothing (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005).  While these 
endogenous risk-coping mechanisms can allow populations to cope with 
income/wealth loss associated with a single hazard, consecutive crises can have 
devastating and long-term consequences on the livelihoods of smallholders.  Natural 
hazards are not exceptional events: in 2005 drought conditions were expected in 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Cambodia and Bolivia; tropical storms (floods) in 
Bangladesh, and wetter-than-average conditions in coastal areas of Ecuador and 
northern Peru (WFP, 2005). 
Ex-ante and ex-post risk coping mechanisms for natural disasters and animal killer 
diseases, such as insurance (ex-ante) schemes and loss compensation funds (ex-post), 
are undersupplied by the market (private agents) as dependent on exogenous 
uncertain and covariating factors, which also provide opportunities for moral hazard 
behaviour by farmers/pastoralists.  A large insurer, for example, that could reduce 
production covariance by insuring pastoralists in distant areas and even in different 
countries, cannot deal with moral hazard behaviours as, because of asymmetry of 
information, smallholders may pretend that their animals have been killed by drought 
conditions though they have sold them to market.  On the other hand, a small local 
insurer, which could somewhat ￿supervise￿ moral hazard behaviour because of its 
social networking, cannot overcome the covariance problem (Binswanger and 
Deininger, 1997).  It follows that smallholders do not have access to insurance for 
natural disasters but in case of public actions. 
Few countries have designed strategies specifically targeted to protect smallholders 
from natural disasters, and these are usually under-funded, uncertain in their 
functioning, and covering limited areas.  Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, in Africa, and 
Bangladesh, in South Asia, have established ex-post insurance mechanisms for 
droughts and floods respectively; in India, a famine code was endorsed under the 
British colony and the country has been financing research for drought proofing forage 
and plans to eradicate rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia; Ecuador 
and Peru have been drafting contingency plans to ensure food security in the case of 
￿el Niæo￿; finally, Senegal intends to invest in rural hydraulic works to reduce the 
negative effects of droughts on land productivity.  All other governments, to our 
knowledge, have not designed any specific and comprehensive strategic framework to 
deal with natural disasters, contributing to make the market mechanism ineffective 
towards smallholders. 
Excessive price variability is another source of income risk for livestock producers.  
For those countries for which times series data are available, livestock input and 
output prices appear to be highly variable, with a coefficient of variation often higher 
for output than input prices. 7. Balancing Livestock Policies 
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  Ethiopia 22.7 14.6 21.5 157.6 11.5 11.1 164.3
  Kenya 41.5 40.9 35.9 32.6 27.9 80.0
  Sudan 85.8 85.8 144.3 101.6 100.2
  Burkina Faso 24.3 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 107.8
  Mali 43.9 20.3 17.2 53.8 20.3 138.5
  Bangladesh 13.5 13.5 4.6 22.8 9.7 4.8
  India 21.0 22.2 15.4 5.6 25.1 88.3 76.0
  Nepal 33.2 25.8 26.9 90.4 29.7
  Cambodia 46.3 35.1 33.7 33.7 49.9 90.8 40.1
  Laos 87.2 74.9 59.3 72.0 81.7 149.6 73.6
  Thailand 17.6 10.9 122.8 145.3 112.4 95.0 19.6
  Bolivia 28.1 22.9 22.0 16.9 15.6 26.3 54.5
  Ecuador 125.5 125.8 107.3 95.8 96.0 100.9 69.3
  Peru 36.9 28.4 33.8 31.3 32.1 27.5 93.6  
Source: elaborated from FAOSTAT (2004) 
 
Swings in price result from seasonal supply changes, but are also associated to 
changing trade flows, disease outbreaks, social events (e.g. the Haji pilgrimage), etc.  
In theory, price shocks can indicate the presence of a frictionless market and, in case 
of a flexible economy, should conduce towards an efficient reallocation of resources.  
In practice, in case of imperfect contracting and limited access to productive assets, 
they result in high level of risk aversion of smallholders and inelastic and counter-
intuitive responses to price signals.  Livestock holders, in fact, are not only producers 
but also consumers of meat and milk; production, therefore, acquires an insurance 
value additional to its contribution to income.  It follows that, when price goes down, 
smallholders reduce production less than profit-maximizing producers, contributing to 
keeping price low.  On the other hand, when output price increases, they reduce 
animal slaughtering, as in the long term cattle and small ruminants are the major 
inputs in their own production, and by so doing they push prices further up.  These 
behaviours contribute to exacerbate price movements with negative consequences for 
the efficient allocation of resources and stability of income (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 
2005; Jarvis, 1986). 
Current sector policies do not include any public intervention to reduce price volatility 
of livestock commodities, but for macroeconomic policies intended to keep inflation 
low.  Following stabilization and structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, in fact, most countries have dismantled state marketing boards and 
ended government involvement in the procurement and distribution of agricultural 
products and price intervention schemes.  Market reforms, however, have been going 
less far than expected, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.  The Cotton 
Marketing Board and the Gum Arabic Company in Sudan, the Coffee and (agricultural) 
Produce Marketing Boards in Uganda, the Malian Company for the Development of 
Textile Fibres and the National Company for Oleaginous Marketing in Senegal are 
examples of existing public involvement in the agricultural sector.  Bangladesh, India 
and Nepal, and partly Laos, support staple food production and distribution, 
particularly rice, through a combination of buffer stock and trade policies.   
Interestingly, parastatals dealing with livestock products, which were typically few in 
numbers and mainly dealing with milk producers (such as the Kenya Cooperative 
Creameries), have all been dismantled or privatized.  The case study countries, 7. Balancing Livestock Policies 
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therefore, while pledging to liberalize input and output markets in order to facilitate 
allocation of resources according to comparative advantages, moderate cereal price 
fluctuations from one season to another and from year to year in order to protect 
consumers and producers.  However, they do not seriously address the issue of price 
fluctuation in livestock commodities. 
6.2  Kick-starting domestic livestock markets 
Access to land, feed and risk-coping mechanisms would not be sufficient to take 
livestock holders out of poverty because of high transaction costs / imperfections in 
financial and animal input / output markets.  Therefore, the way governments 
regulate credit markets, the supply of preventive and curative animal health services, 
drug distribution, extension services as well as output markets is crucial for paving a 
way for livestock holders to escape poverty. 
6.2.1  Access to formal credit 
Public rural financial institutions, which had been the principal supplier of subsidies to 
agriculture during the 1970s and the 1980s, have been mostly dismantled or 
privatized, and governments have reduced their roles in the provision of insurance for 
use as collateral for loans.  Despite there is over-whelming evidence that almost all 
rural credit went to rural elites, according to many financial market liberalization, 
even though efficiency-enhancing, has had a negative impact on the access of 
smallholders to credit (e.g. de Janvry et al., 1997).  Rural dwellers, in fact, are 
intrinsically more difficult to provide with financial services than their urban 
counterparts, being poor, lacking collateral, spatially dispersed, and subject to high 
transaction costs.  They are thus trapped into a low-wealth-low-growth vicious circle 
as, being rationed on the credit market, they can enter only into technology and 
activity portfolios with lower returns and are not able to start accumulating savings 
(capital). 
In recent years governments in the sample countries have recognized that liberalized 
financial markets in underdeveloped areas are often not able to meet the demand for 
credit by the poor rural dwellers.  In Ethiopia, regional governments act as 
intermediaries between commercial banks and farmers; in Sudan, since 1999 the 
government has been providing direct lending and guarantees for agricultural loans 
within a consortium of agricultural banks; in Tanzania, the government has given legal 
status to Savings and Credit Cooperatives; in Burkina Faso, the Caisse National de 
Credit Agricole charges below market interest rates to farmers; since 1998 Mali has 
been carrying out a National Strategy for Microfinance.  In South and Southeast Asia, 
rural public banks are still performing a significant role along with a growing number 
of microfinance institutions, such as the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development in India, the Bangladesh Rural Development Bank, the Agricultural 
Development Bank in Nepal, the Agricultural Promotion Bank in Laos and the 
Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development.  Finally, in Latin America, 
main sources of credit for farmers are microfinance institutions, with the exception of 
Peru where in 2001 the government established AgroBanco with the explicit aim of 
releasing sustainable loans to farmers. 
Despite these efforts, access to formal credit is still inadequate for the majority of 
the resource poor, suggesting that current policies are ineffective and/or likely to 
benefit the well-to-do.  In Sudan, only 1-2 percent of all agricultural credit is 
extended to smallholders; in Mali, microfinance institutions, which provide credit to 
rural households, account for only 3 percent of all disbursed loans; in Laos, almost 80 7. Balancing Livestock Policies 
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percent of rural households have never received a loan; in Ecuador, over 92 percent of 
agricultural producers do not have access to formal credit. 
Current policy thrusts are not likely to significantly reverse this trend, and poor 
livestock holders are expected to be credit-rationed also in the years to come.  On the 
one hand, credit programs specifically targeted for animal production have been 
designed in four countries only.  In Nepal, low interest rate credit is available for the 
purchase of livestock from the Agricultural Development Bank; in Thailand, there is a 
no interest loan program to support hog farmers; in Kenya, the Ministry of Agriculture 
offers rural communities heifers through micro-loan in the coastal region; in Senegal, 
the intention is to set up lines of credit specifically targeted to actors in the livestock 
production chain.  On the other hand, current policies tend to address only the 
weaknesses of existing financial institutions, rather than to promote the development 
of the entire rural financial environment. 
 
... reform the commercial banking system, reorganize and strengthen the health of 
financial and credit organizations (Vietnam, the Socialist Republic of, 2003). 
 
Expansion of the decentralized savings and loan approaches in complementarity with the 
National Agricultural Credit Bank of Senegal ought to expand the financing and income-
enhancing opportunities for farmers (Senegal, Republic of, 2002). 
 
A Financial Sector Strategy Statement was prepared in 2001 and its key recommendations 
are now being implemented. These include: (i) Strengthening the autonomy and authority 
of the Nepal Rastra Bank; (ii) Enhancing its capacity for supervision and regulation of 
commercial banks; (iii) Concurrently, the two major banks (which own nearly 60% of the 
banking assets) have been placed under external management in order to address their 
deep-rooted management and financial problems and possible restructuring needs (Nepal, 
Kingdom of, 2003). 
 
Rural lending institutions should of course attain financial sustainability, eschew 
government and donor assistance, charge interest rates commensurate to the full cost 
of the loan and high enough to mobilize savings.  The central issue in financing the 
poor, however, lies beyond traditional financial networks and is deep-rooted in the 
very structure of an underdeveloped rural economy.  This includes asymmetric 
information between financial institutions and farmers, high and covariant risks in 
livestock production, lack of insurance / collaterals from the part of smallholders, 
etc.  While there are no blueprint solutions to reforming the financial system, the 
socio-economic literature has recently emphasized the effectiveness of innovative 
approaches to provide poor farmers with credit.  Pearce et al. (2004), for instance, 
report that micro-insurance could have a strong leverage on agricultural finance; that 
better access to output market makes rural households more reliable borrowers; that 
contract growing schemes can provide ample avenues in providing credit to livestock 
holders; that improved contract enforceability supports the functioning of rural 
financial markets.  Existing policy documents, however, fail to propose innovative and 
experimental solutions to the financing problem of the poor, and simply emphasize 
the importance of efficient orthodox financial institutions, which however do not 
adequately serve the poor and, when serve them, are not always sustainable.  Even 
traditional micro-finance institutions remain often substantially subsidized (Morduch, 
2000). 7. Balancing Livestock Policies 
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6.2.2  Animal health services and extension 
Beyond credit, access to an adequate and affordable supply of animal health and 
extension services is essential for effective livestock production, even though little is 
known about the impact of specific endemic, epidemic and zoonotic animal diseases 
on the livelihoods of the poor. 
In all countries examined, animal diseases severely constraint meat/milk production 
and smallholder income.  In Bangladesh, endemic Foot-and-Mouth disease is estimated 
to halve the capacity of buffalo herds to work during rice planting, and reduce milk 
yields by 80 percent; in Cambodia, disease outbreaks (mainly Newcastle disease) 
regularly decimate village poultry flocks and there are high mortality rates in pigs as 
well (mainly due to Swine Fever); in Uganda, Newcastle disease in poultry, African 
Swine Fever in pigs, and Foot-and-Mouth disease in cattle contribute to low 
productivity of livestock; in Laos, sporadic disease epidemics frequently kill most pigs 
and chickens in upland villages, and the mortality rate of buffalo calves due to 
internal parasites is particularly high.  Heffernan at al. (2001, quoted in IFAD, 2004) 
carried out 1700 household surveys in Kenya, Bolivia and India and concluded that 
livestock diseases are the most significant problem for approximately 20 percent of all 
producers.
16 
Since the 1960s governments in a large number of countries built heavily subsidised 
systems and networks of services delivery, but the rigorous budgetary policies 
connected to macroeconomic and institutional reforms have been forcing most 
countries to reform animal health services.  Two complementary approaches are being 
adopted: decentralization and privatization of services.  A number of governments 
have decentralized animal health services provision to local government units, such as 
Uganda, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam and Bolivia; at the same time, private actors 
have been allowed to supply veterinary services, particularly drug distribution and 
curative services, such as in most sub-Saharan African countries.  While both 
decentralization and privatization can be pro-poor, policy documents lack of a clear 
vision of the hows and whys the reformed animal health services will serve the poor. 
First, privatization and decentralization may be both ineffective as far as the roles of 
public and private sector in service provision are not clarified, as it is today 
acknowledged that animal health services present a mixture of private/public goods.  
For example, clinical veterinary services and distribution of drugs can be considered 
as private goods; disease surveillance and prevention and food safety are classified as 
public goods (Ahuja, 2004).  Which services are best provided by the private sector, 
which by decentralized and/or central authorities?  Second, decentralization may 
provide incentives for the local elite to perform collective actions and ￿privatize￿ local 
government agencies, and it does not change the attitude and the capacity of service 
providers; it is true that it may render services more effective, but the core problems 
of public delivery of services (funds and incentives) do not change.  For instance, in 
Ethiopia, the regional departments of veterinary services often lack of vaccines and 
drugs.  In India, the number of federal state-run veterinary institutions was 54,912 in 
2003, with some 100,000 professionals and para-professionals; the quality of services 
provided by these institutions was often poor, especially as they were not adequately 
equipped with clinical diagnosis facilities, with reported indiscriminate use of 
antibiotics and other drugs, high costs and potential threats to human health.  Third, 
privatization is not necessarily pro-poor.  Poor livestock keepers are in many cases 
willing to pay for animal health services, but it is a formidable challenge to develop a 
system that is both affordable for the poor and, at the same time, profitable for the 
service providers.  In a study from Kenya, it was shown that livestock keepers spend 
                                                 
16 The majority of households rank lack of access to fodder and water as their most binding constraint, followed by animal 
diseases.  After these, problems vary across countries and areas within countries widely. 7. Balancing Livestock Policies 
37 
about 50 percent less than required to access efficient animal health services (IFAD, 
2004).  In Mali, the ongoing process of privatization appears to have encouraged the 
demand of veterinary services, but serious concerns are about livestock holders in the 
most remote areas; because of high transaction costs, in fact, service providers find it 
unprofitable to serve far-off and sparsely populated areas.  In Burkina Faso, increased 
demand for veterinary services is stimulating the development of public and private 
animal health services; services fees are particularly high, however, and the focus is 
exclusively on cattle and small ruminants, neglecting diseases of poultry which are 
mainly raised by the poor rural dwellers.  Finally, in South Asia, public veterinarians 
are allowed to charge for services they provide outside office hours; this reduces the 
incentives for private actors to enter the service business and constraints the 
development of an efficient system of private services delivery. 
In order to make services delivery pro-poor, a number of innovative experiences are 
being implemented, such as support to para-professionals, to community-based animal 
health workers, government sub-contracting and networking between 
paraprofessionals and veterinarians.  While there are both successful and unsuccessful 
examples of these innovative approaches, the policy documents do not aim at scaling 
up effective programs country-wide and tend to follow the mainstream approach to 
services delivery, which is delineated by the macro framework and appears to be 
driven more by budgetary and efficiency considerations than by the determination of 
establishing an effective system of animal health services delivery for the poor.   
Second, policy documents fail to consider services to livestock production within the 
broader context of agricultural extension, whereas producers necessitate also 
information about crop-livestock interaction, market opportunities and marketing 
strategies. 
6.2.3  Access to domestic output markets 
A poultry vaccination campaign in India proved unsuccessful as, despite chickens 
surviving for a longer time, farmers withdraw from the program because of lack of 
accessible output markets for poultry meat.  On the Bolivia Altiplano, livestock 
holders who had favorable price and a reliable market outlet widely adopted fodder 
production technologies in a complex crop rotation of potatoes, quinoa and onion with 
alfalfa and oats for hay (IFAD, 2004).  ￿Access to markets is another precondition for 
livestock development; economic growth of poor livestock keepers will depend on fair 
market access for their livestock produce￿ (IFAD, 2004, p.xvii); ￿...it is not the 
subsidized service delivery but access to output market and general awareness level 
that determines the demand for veterinary services￿ (Ahuja et al., 2004, p.31). 
Two sets of elements determine access to markets for livestock holders: household 
idiosyncratic characteristics and the broader institutional/physical infrastructure, 
where infrastructure refers here to the institutional architecture and livestock-
marketing facilities.
17  Lapar et al. (2003) show that smallholder participation (and 
selling decisions) to markets are mostly affected by income, educational level, 
extension visits, composition of livestock assets (cattle, pigs, chicken) and 
information; Were Omano (1998) maintains that smallholders may reject the adoption 
of technically feasible and production-increasing innovations if these involve high 
market transaction costs;  Staal et al. (1995) argue that, while individual households 
may face insurmountable transaction costs to markets, grassroots organizations 
reduce marketing costs and government should provide an enabling environment for 
local groups and private enterprises to collaborate.  In general, income level, land 
assets, ownership of livestock, non-farm earnings, proximity to markets, educational 
                                                 
17  See section 5.2 for a brief review of broader infrastructural policies. 7. Balancing Livestock Policies 
38 
level and membership to producer organizations are household characteristics 
positively associated with access to markets. 
Incentives to market participation depend also on the institutional architecture and 
existing livestock-marketing infrastructure.  Under this perspective, sub-Saharan 
African producers face the strongest constraints to access markets profitably.  In 
Ethiopia, livestock are the most repeatedly taxed agricultural commodity, because of 
a number of marketing and transit fees, which are usually not reinvested in the 
sector; in Sudan, many of the 23 Federal States rely heavily on livestock taxes as their 
primary source of revenue: there are over 20 types of taxes and fees between Darfur 
(western Sudan) and Port Sudan (eastern Sudan) for sheep, and around 17 taxes 
between Darfur and the Sudan-Egypt border for camels; the Kenyan Cooperative 
Creameries closed down because farmers were unable to find reliable buyers for milk 
and the current 45 existing processing firms are unable to handle the 3.8 million of 
liters produced annually; canning and freezing plants for beef are found only in 
Nairobi, Thika, and Nakuru and poor livestock producers get 40 percent of consumer 
price; in Uganda, livestock markets are run by private individuals who charge 
unregulated fees, and slaughterhouses are few and located only in urban centres; in 
Mali, domestic marketing is competitive, but the only existing abattoir, located in 
Bamako, is in the hands of the government which has not been able to sell it since the 
last six years, denoting that the private sector finds it unprofitable to enter into meat 
processing; in Senegal, the marketing system is dominated by a small network of 
exchanges based on ethnic relations and contacts, and therefore is not competitive, 
while existing abattoirs are in extremely poor conditions. 
In Asia and Latin America output markets are more competitive than in Africa, even 
though bottlenecks exist: in Nepal, most markets are organized around the quasi-
monopolistic ￿Four Legged Buying and Selling Cooperative Ltd￿; in Laos, local 
governments significantly constraint livestock trade, establishing quotas for animals to 
be moved across provinces; in India, the Operation Flood Program succeeded in 
establishing linkages between milk producers in rural areas and urban consumers
18; in 
Bolivia, existing slaughterhouses are able to process half of the meat consumed in the 
country; in Ecuador, though there are over 200 abattoirs, 89 percent are in urban and 
peri-urban areas and only 11 percent in rural areas. 
The current state of affairs partly depends on the unsatisfactory sequence of reforms 
implemented in most countries.  There is a general agreement that price reforms 
should be attempted before removal of all marketing regulations, and that measures 
to promote a competitive private sector should be initiated long before dismantling 
the public sector (Bardhan, 2001).  Most countries, however, have liberalized the 
entire marketing system through dismantling public marketing boards without having 
in place the economic and institutional infrastructure necessary for a thriving and 
efficient private sector to develop (see section 5.2).  Current policies on livestock 
marketing, where existing, intend to fill these gaps through government financing.  In 
Bangladesh, the government has recognized that increasing the number of rural 
marketing facilities is a means of improving sale prices in remote rural areas, and the 
Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) is designing a ￿market growth￿ 
program.  Burkina Faso provides funds to slaughterhouses and supports cooperative 
and grassroots organizations; it also organizes livestock national-days (journée du lait, 
du porcs, de la volaille) to indirectly contribute to market development.  In India, a 
centrally sponsored scheme ￿Assistance to States for improvement / modernisation of 
abattoirs, establishment of carcass utilization centres￿ is being implemented since the 
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8
th Five Year Plan.  Under this scheme, which should terminate in 2004-2005, financial 
assistance is given to State Governments on a 50:50 basis for building abattoirs; 100 
percent financial assistance is provided for building plants and machinery and effluent 
treatment, and 50 percent for water, electricity and land development for 
establishing carcass utilization centres.  Overall, however, the few existing 
interventions on livestock marketing appear to be piecemeal and neither driven by 
any specific guideline and policy thrust, nor by detail considerations of the 
multiplicity of factors limiting access to markets for smallholders. 
6.3  Expanding livestock markets 
6.3.1  Livestock research 
Once smallholders have secure and adequate access to basic inputs and markets have 
been ￿kick-started￿, two elements can support the development of a thriving and 
sustainable pro-poor livestock sector in the long run: research activities, which should 
allow countries to satisfy the growing demand of high quality livestock products and 
by-products; and international trade, which should allow smallholders to benefit from 
increased livestock demand worldwide and specialize in what they have a comparative 
advantage at. 
The genetic traits of local breeds, such as hardiness, disease resistance, and 
multipurpose, have developed over centuries and are very relevant to poor livestock 
keepers.  Good examples are resistance of African zebu cattle to vector-borne disease 
such as East Coast Fever, and West African cattle and sheep breeds with tolerance to 
African Trypanosomiosis (IFAD, 2004).  As consumer preferences change, there is 
scope to develop alternative breeds so that poor livestock holders may satisfy demand 
for high-quality livestock products and not be crowded out by large scale industrial 
farms. 
Agricultural research budgets, however, have been traditionally very low in most 
developing countries and, following current macroeconomic and institutional policies, 
have been further reduced.  At the same time, research centres have been undergoing 
significant reorganization, though all research institutions of significant dimension are 
still managed by public authorities.  Some countries have centralized the entire set of 
research activities into one broad-based research centre, to take advantage of 
economies of scale.  For example, the Ethiopian Research Organization, the 
Independent National Institute for Agricultural Research in Ecuador and the 
Agricultural Research Council in Nepal are responsible for all agricultural research in 
their respective countries.  Some other countries have decentralized and delocalized 
their research institutions to take advantage of specialization.  In Uganda, there are 
nine research centres located in different agro-zones across the country; the 
Senegalese Institute of Agricultural Research has been reorganized in eight institutions 
each carrying out research in different agro-ecological zones; four research 
institutions have been established in Ecuador to conduct research for products grown 
in the highlands, the valleys, the tropic semiarid region and the humid tropics; the 
recently established Bolivian Agricultural Technology Institute comprises four 
Foundations, one for each main agro-ecological zones.  Peru is an unusual case: five 
agricultural research centres have been converted into private foundations but 
salaries of staff are paid by the central government. 
How this institutional reorganization will affect livestock research is unknown.  First, 
only Bangladesh possesses a research centre specifically established for livestock (the 
Bangladesh Livestock Research Institute), while in all other countries livestock 
research is carried out by agricultural research institutions.  Second, funds for 
livestock research are typically less than proportional compared to the role of the 7. Balancing Livestock Policies 
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sector in the economy, and livestock is given secondary relevance compared to crops.  
In Ethiopia, for instance, research efforts have been mainly on intensification of crop 
production by small farmers, and the Cambodian Agricultural Research and 
Development Institute has traditionally focused on wet and dry rice.  On the other 
hand, all policy documents emphasize the relevance of livestock research: Ethiopia 
plans to increase productivity of local cows by artificial insemination and preserving 
and improving indigenous breeds; in Kenya, research will be carried out on livestock 
breeds and indigenous stock; the Ugandan government intends to invest in livestock 
genetic improvement; in Mali, research programs on small ruminants, poultry and 
bovines have been designed; Peru plans to improve the quality of alpaca fibre for 
camelids through genetic improvements, artificial insemination, and sanitary 
programmes; since the 1990s Ecuador has been introducing European and Asian breeds 
to improve the qualities of the native Creole breeds. 
C o m p a r e d  t o  A f r i c a  a n d  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  r e s e a r c h  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  A s i a  f o c u s  b o t h  o n  
livestock and fodder production.  India has endorsed a broad long term program for 
both genetic improvement and fodder crops development; in Nepal, seed production 
programmes to promote the sustainable use of grazing lands have been recently 
initiated; in Thailand, the Department of Livestock Development has embarked on an 
ambitious program of forage improvement for upland cropping systems, rainfed 
lowland rice systems and agro-forestry systems; the Cambodian government plans to 
establish a National Livestock Research Centre to develop and disseminate appropriate 
technology for animal raising and feeding. 
Whether research activities will be pro-poor in the long run is not clear.  First, it must 
be emphasized the research development could not be achieved by the profit-seeking 
efforts of (poor) farmers and private institutions, as it is always difficult to set and 
protect patents on agricultural/livestock ￿inventions￿.  Public supported institutions 
are expected to develop pro-poor technologies with public good attributes, and their 
capacity will be clearly dependent on availability of funds.  Second, with the 
exception of India, in no country there are specific directives about pro-poor research 
activities and research institutes often prioritize their efforts according to lobbying 
criteria.  Third, whereas universities and non-profit organizations are most likely to 
carry out pro-poor research, no policy document explicitly envisages the necessity of 
establishing firm and long-term relations with actors beyond the government agencies 
themselves.  Finally, in no case do the policy documents refer to the issue of 
technology adoption by poor smallholders and, consequently, to the relations among 
public and private extension service providers and research institutions. 
6.3.2  Access to international markets 
Livestock and livestock products contribute one-sixth to agricultural world trade 
value.  Developed countries are net exporters of virtually all livestock products, while 
developing countries are mostly net importers of milk (equivalent) and marginally 
import meat products (Upton, 2001). 
The current trend toward markets integration is supposed to benefit both developed 
and developing countries, as shifting allocation of resources intersectorally according 
to comparative advantages should promote economic growth and poverty reduction, 
and several of the case-study countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, boast a 
comparative advantage in livestock production.
19  A recent World Bank (2003a) study 
shows that the 24 developing countries that increased the most their integration into 
the world economy over the last two decades have achieved higher growth not only in 
incomes, but also in life expectancy and education.  On the other hand, the causal 
                                                 
19 According to Stiglitz (1998), the main gains from trade seem to come inter-temporally as a result of increased efficiency, 
with little sectoral shift. 7. Balancing Livestock Policies 
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relations between international trade and poverty reduction are not yet well 
understood, probably because of the countless ways through which trade can impact 
o n  p o v e r t y ,  s u c h  a s  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  a n d  p r i c e  m o v e m e n t s ,  e m p l o y m e n t  
creation/destruction, movement in the balance of payments, changes in the 
bargaining power along the global production chains, changing ratios between 
tradable and non-tradable commodities (UNCTAD, 2004). 
The countries examined are widely open to international markets.  They are members 
of regional economic communities, such as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN).  All 
countries are also WTO member, but for Ethiopia, Laos, Sudan and Vietnam, which 
have however submitted request for accession.  Trade value averages 58.7 percent of 
GDP at aggregate level, higher than United States (24 percent) and below the average 
of the European Union (69 percent).  Southeast Asia is particularly open to global 
markets, with trade value being at 112 percent of GDP compared to 45 to 55 percent 
of the other regional aggregates (World Bank, 2004b). 
Since the late 1990s, however, global trade in agricultural products has been 
characterized by a gradual increase in sanitary and phytosanitary barriers (FAO, 2003).  
For instance, BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) and Foot-and Mouth disease 
have led countries over the 1998-2001 period to impose import bans and stricter 
sanitary requirements, as well as other technical barriers, such as requirements on 
labelling and animal traceability schemes.  In Ethiopia export bans and limited 
slaughtering capacity constrain livestock and meat export to 4 percent of total export 
earnings; the Ugandan Beef Producers￿ Association maintains that the country does 
not export any significant quantity of meat because of sanitary barriers and lack of 
any export-standard abattoir.  The case study countries, however, appear not to be 
significantly affected by sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) barriers, being net importers 
and modest exporters of selected livestock products, and trading mainly inter-
regionally (table A3).  India exports live animals and some milk, but imports 
significant quantities of feed and fodder; Nepal imports around half of its current 
meat requirement; Cambodian livestock trade is almost inexistent, while Lao PDR 
exports some cattle and buffaloes to Thailand; Bolivia is a net although modest 
importer of chicken and dry whole cow milk.  There are two exceptions: Thailand is 
the fourth world exporter of poultry meat and imports milk for over US$ 200 million 
(2002); in Burkina Faso, livestock is the second biggest export earner, accounting for 
about 20 percent of the total export values. 
National policy documents emphasise the importance of livestock trade for 
development, particularly Southeast Asian countries that explicitly aim at establishing 
an outward-oriented livestock sector.  Mali plans to expand tradable livestock exports 
by 6 percent per year; Kenya intends to create disease free zones to facilitate the 
export of live animals, and to encourage private investors to establish export-standard 
slaughterhouses; the Ugandan Beef Producers￿ Association plans to build an export 
quality abattoir in Kampala; Bangladesh will support farms exporting poultry, beef and 
dairy products; Cambodia plans to encourage the development of meat processing 
industry to stimulate exports; Lao aims at expanding livestock exports to US$ 50 
million by 2020; Vietnam plans to develop high-quality cattle and poultry for exports 
on a large scale in the future; Bolivia intends to support production, processing and 
marketing of livestock products with a focus on export markets; Peru aims at 
developing an industrial livestock sector able to compete on international markets.  
Some countries, such as Ethiopia and Peru, also intend to soon harmonize sanitary 
standards according to the SPS Agreement finalized under WTO. 
While the focus on livestock exports is reasonable given the current global 
development trends, and in the long run all countries will be required to meet 
international sanitary standards, this appears somewhat at odds with the fact that, in 7. Balancing Livestock Policies 
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the last two decades, local production has been rarely able to satisfy the growing 
n a t i o n a l  d e m a n d  f o r  f o o d  o f  a n i m a l  o r i g i n .   I n  t h e  n e x t  c o m i n g  y e a r s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
priority should be given to those complementarity policies necessary for domestic 
supply to meet national and regional demand, and avoid local (poor) producers be 
substituted by foreign competitors despite boasting a comparative advantage in 
livestock production.  In Tanzania, for instance, a study about trade in agricultural 
products shows that transport costs to Dar es Salaam from the most distant and 
nearest markets exceed by 60 and 25 percent total marketing costs borne by 
international traders (inclusive of prices and costs of transport, loading and unloading 
expenses, market fees, storage costs and bribes) (Santorum and Tabaijuka, 1992).   
Hence, if the policy priority is poverty reduction, countries should first consider 
reducing transaction costs to markets for smallholders and setting up regional sanitary 
and phitosanitary standards so as to efficiently regulate inter-regional trade and 
improve the nutritional status of local population.  It is only in the long run that 
export markets could be targeted and international sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards met to avoid local producers be excluded by global trade and, eventually, 
crowded out by international competitors  
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7. BALANCING LIVESTOCK POLICIES 
In the last twenty years in the case-study countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
livestock production has been unable to keep pace with the growing demand for food 
of animal origin.  Even the poultry sector, which is considered leading the ￿livestock 
revolution￿, has been performing badly in most countries, with the exception of 
Ecuador, India, Peru, Thailand and Vietnam.  Yet, the broad-based development of 
the livestock sector could significantly contribute to poverty reduction, particularly in 
East and West Africa, as a large share of the poor are livestock keepers.  The current 
policy thrusts, however, appear not to take full advantage of the pro-poor 
opportunities provided by the livestock revolution, despite poverty having been placed 
at the centre of the development agenda. 
GDP growth and poverty reduction are the overreaching aims of all national policy 
documents, and macroeconomic stability and improved governance are deemed to 
support these objectives. These are pan-territorial policies undifferentiated by 
household typologies, and are necessary but not sufficient to take the poor livestock 
holders out of low-income equilibria.  Specific sector policies should address those 
market imperfections affecting rural areas and preventing the poor livestock keepers 
from deriving benefits from increased meat/milk demand. 
Few countries appear to have designed a comprehensive and consistent pro-poor 
strategy for the development of the livestock sector, which is overlooked in most 
policy documents.  Ethiopia, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso and India have appreciated the 
relevance of livestock development for poverty reduction, but decoupled livestock 
production from poverty reduction; Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Senegal, Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru have either 
identified a shopping list of actions for livestock development, or neglected the sub-
sector tout-court.  Consequently, the designed sector policies are not consistently 
biased towards the poor livestock holders.  They tend to be undifferentiated between 
livestock species and agro-ecological zones, making it more difficult targeting the very 
poor, who face specific technological constraints and market imperfections.  The 
issues of vulnerability and access to land and water, which are key constraints for 
poor livestock holders, are given marginal priority in current policy documents.  Much 
more emphasis is given to policies promoting access to credit, animal health services 
and, partly, access to markets.  These, however, have not an adequate focus on the 
resource poor: efficient credit institutions do not necessarily serve the poor livestock 
keepers; privatization of animal health services contributes to increasing the income 
of the poor rural dwellers only under special circumstances.  All policy documents 
appreciate the relevance of livestock research, but in no case priorities are given to 
pro-poor research activities; for example, they not even mention issues of technology 
dissemination and adoption by the poor.  Finally, most countries have a focus on 
livestock export markets in spite of being often net importers of milk and meat 
products. 
The current policy framework appears unbalanced under two perspectives.  First, it 
implicitly focuses on livestock production and productivity, rather than on the poor 
livestock holders and poverty reduction through livestock development.
20  S e c o n d ,  
current policies are biased towards ￿kick-starting livestock domestic markets￿ and 
￿expanding output markets￿.  Yet, secure access to basic production inputs (land, 
water, feed) and reduced vulnerability are key elements for the poor livestock holders 
                                                 
20 Note that increased livestock production per se does not necessarily benefit poor smallholders because of the fallacy of 
composition: at the household level higher production tends to make the poor livestock keepers better off; but if all 
households produce more they will be better off only if the price elasticity of demand is greater than one, which is rarely the 
case (Delgado and Courbois, 1998; quoted in Delgado et al. 1999).  Furthermore, in developing countries the elasticity of 
food demand is negatively correlated to per capita income; it follows that opportunities from the livestock revolution will be 
reduced by the advance of the livestock revolution itself. 7. Balancing Livestock Policies 
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to efficiently respond to ￿kick-starting￿ and ￿expanding￿ market policies, otherwise 
they tend to overproduce food for insurance, be slow in technology adoption, and 
accumulate rather than invest savings. 
How to redress the unbalances in livestock policies?  The inclusion of livestock in the 
national policy documents, and in the poverty reduction strategy papers in particular, 
is widely recognized as the most relevant step to be taken in this direction (e.g. SerØ, 
2004).  While this action seems obvious and may be beneficial, it is not necessarily the 
most appropriate.  The policy reduction strategy papers, in fact, present a number of 
gaps going beyond the livestock sector.  Environmental issues are weakly dealt in the 
national policy documents; marginally and insignificantly addressed are also issues 
relating to child-poverty, rural-urban migration, the informal economy, landless 
labourers, gender, forestry, population growth, urban slums.  The list could be 
endless.  Expectations are that national governments will be lobbied by a plethora of 
supranational agencies, donors and national/international interest groups to include 
this or that issue in their national development strategy. 
Four strategies can facilitate coming out from this impasse and pave a way for 
livestock holders to escape poverty.  First, different donors and international agencies 
should cooperate with each other.  This is not na￿ve, as the situation replicates that of 
a non-cooperative game where each player will be better off if cooperates, but has no 
incentives to cooperate.  For instance, if the livestock player expected all other 
actors not to lobby for having a specific issue addressed by the national policy 
document, then it would have incentives to push for livestock to be included, alone, 
in the overall development strategy.  Second, efforts should be pursued to increase 
national ownership/participation of development strategies which, according to many, 
is severely lacking (e.g. Stewart and Wang, 2003; World Bank, 2004a).  This is a 
current and recurrent theme: ￿empowerment￿, ￿participatory process￿, ￿institutional 
building￿, ￿bottom-up approach￿ are among the most abused terms in the current 
socio-economic literature.  The challenge, therefore, is not discussing about 
participatory approach but to make the approach participatory so as to better 
consider the endogeneity of local institutions while designing development policies 
and strategies.  Third, if the policy priority is poverty reduction, national planning 
documents should be built around the poor with a minor focus on increased (livestock) 
production and the ensuing, often intuitive, trickle down effects to the poor.  This 
should imply, as a preliminary step, a deeper and more disaggregated analysis of the 
poor household, bringing to light what are the roles of livestock in its portfolio of 
activities and identifying the priority areas of intervention for the livestock sector to 
effectively contribute to poverty reduction.  Fourth, once and if a budget for livestock 
development had been allocated in the national policy documents, livestock policies 
w o u l d  h a v e  t o  b e  d e s i g n e d  w i t h i n  t h e  broader agricultural sector development 
strategy.  This should entail having a dynamic and long-term vision of the sector role 
in the agricultural and national economy, which goes beyond current meat/milk 
production, including, for instance, environment protection; it should also avoid 
livestock policies be exclusively focused on animal health services, taking into account 
the broader set of market and institutional imperfections trapping the poor livestock 
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Table A 1. Putting livestock policies in context 
Country Relevant ministry
Ethiopia
Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Reduction Program, 2002




Ministry of Agriculture & Rural 
Development
Kenya
Investment Programme for the Economic 





Ministry of Livestock and 
Fisheries Development
Sudan
Twenty Five Year Comprehensive 
Development Strategy, 2003-2027
Agricultural Development and 
Investment Strategy
Livestock Development Plan Ministry of Animal Resources
Tanzania Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2000
Agricultural Sector 
Development Strategy
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock Development
Uganda Poverty Erdication Action Plan, March 2000
Plan for Modernization of 
Agriculture
Livestock Sector Intervention 
Strategy
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Industry and Fisheries
East Africa
Burkina Faso Poverty reduction strategy paper, 2000
Sustainabe Growth Strategy 
for Agriculture and a Strategic 
Operating Plan
Plan d’actions et programme 
d’investissement du secteur de 
l’Ølevage
MinistŁre des ressources 
animales
Mali Poverty reduction strategy paper, 2002
Rural Development Master 
Plan
MinistŁre du developpement 
rural et de l’eau
Senegal Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2002





A National Strategy for Economic Growth, 
Poverty Reduction and Social Development, 
2003
National Agricultural Policy 
(NAP), 1999
Ministry of Fishery and 
Livestock
India 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007)




The Tenth Plan (Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper), 2002-2007
Agricultural Perspective Plan, 
1997








Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishery
Laos
National Growth and Poverty Eradication 
Strategy, 2004
Vision 2020 on Agricultural 
Development
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry
Thailand
9th National Economic and Social 
Development Plan, 2002.
Agricultural Development Plan
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives
Vietnam
The Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Strategy, 2003.
Agricultural and Rural 
Development Plan 2004




Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, March 
2001
National Policy for Agricultural
and Rural Development
Ministerio de Asuntos 
Campesinos y Agropecuarios
Ecuador
Programa de Ordenamiento Econ￿mico y 
Desarrollo Humano, 2003
Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Ganaderia
Peru
Plan Nacional De Superacion de la Pobreza, 
2004-2006

























GDP (million US$ 1995)




















Ethiopia 72,420 84.1 198.6 1,000 30.7 34.8 65.2 7,887,290,000 622 41.8 79.8 n.a. 4.2 31.3 n.a. n.a. 0.359
Kenya 32,420 59.4 72.8 569 46.5 19.5 80.5 10,225,780,000 900 16.6 18.5 3.5 1.9 26.5 42.0 46.4 0.488
Sudan 34,333 60.2 15.4 2,376 56.3 12.4 87.6 11,644,990,000 1779 39.2 69.5 3.0 5.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.505
Tanzania 37,671 63.5 59.6 884 45.4 12.7 87.3 7,692,649,000 531 43.4 84.2 0.9* 4.4 19.9 n.a. n.a. 0.407
Uganda 26,699 87.7 190.2 197 62.5 58.5 41.5 9,264,139,000 1279 33.1 89.6 3.9 6.7 36.7 n.a. n.a. 0.493
Average 40,709 71.0 107.3 1,005 48.3 27.6 72.4 9,342,969,600 1,022 34.8 68.3 2.8 4.6 28.6 n.a. n.a. 0.450
Burkina Faso 13,393 81.8 105.4 274 38 42.3 57.7 3,577,868,000 1023 31 92.4 3.3 4.4 61.2 n.a. n.a. 0.302
Mali 13,409 67 25.9 1,220 28.4 13.5 86.5 3,937,321,000 864 36.3 85.8 2.0 5.6 72.8 n.a. n.a. 0.326
Senegal 10,339 49.7 63 193 42.3 30.7 69.3 6,586,644,000 1463 16.9 76.7 1.6 4.8 26.3 n.a. n.a. 0.437
Average 12,380 66.2 64.8 562.3 36.2 28.8 71.2 4,700,611,000 1,117 28.1 85.0 2.3 4.9 53.4 n.a. n.a. 0.355
Bangladesh 149,664 75.4 1249.7 130 69.4 93.4 6.6 56,621,890,000 1553 21.7 62.1 4.0 5.0 29.1 35.6 39.8 0.509
India 1,081,229 71.5 426.5 2,973 60.9 93.9 6.1 558,644,300,000 2530 22.7 66.7 5.2 6.2 44.2 35.0 36.7 0.595
Nepal 25,725 84.5 432 143 35.2 65.5 34.5 6,014,511,000 1233 40.1 78.5 5.3 4.4 37.7 42.0 44 0.504
Average 418,873 77.1 702.7 1,082.0 55.2 84.3 15.7 207,093,567,000 1,772 28 69 4.8 5.2 37 37.5 40 0.536
Cambodia 14,482 80.7 220.4 177 30.1 71.7 28.3 5,597,822,000 1904 35.6 70.2 n.a. 6.8 n.a. 36.1 40.1 0.568
Laos 5,787 78.9 242.9 231 8.1 53.3 46.7 2,771,816,000 1649 50.9 78.1 3.4** 6.2 n.a. 46.1 53 0.534
Thailand 63,465 67.9 213.6 511 39.5 96 4.0 197,325,800,000 6592 8.8 46.2 8.7 3.6 < 0.2 13.1 15.5 0.768
Viet Nam 82,481 73.8 637.9 325 29.3 93.3 6.7 35,607,440,000 2165 23.0 69.1 5.6** 7.4 n.a. 50.9 57.2 0.691
Average 41,554 75.3 328.7 311.0 26.8 78.6 21.4 60,325,719,500 3,078 29.6 65.9 5.9 6.0 n.a. 36.6 41 0.640
Bolivia 8,973 36.2 8.8 1,084 34.1 8.4 91.6 8,479,420,000 2215 14.6 4.9 2.1 3.3 11.3 n.a. 79.1 0.681
Ecuador 13,192 37.8 61.7 277 29.2 37 63.0 23,612,060,000 3203 9.1 7.7 2.8 2.3 20.2 35.0 47 0.735
Peru 27,567 25.7 22.6 1,280 24.5 13.7 86.3 66,178,730,000 4580 7.8 8.8 0.7 4.3 15.5 49.0 64.7 0.752
Average 16,577 33.2 31.0 880.3 29.3 19.7 80.3 32,756,736,667 3,333 10.5 7.1 1.9 3.3 15.7 42.0 64 0.723
Total average 106,019 64.6 246.9 768.2 39.1 47.8 52.2 62,843,920,753 2,064 26.2 59.1 3.5 4.8 33.7 38.7 48.4 0.5
* 1989-1993; ** 1985-2003
Economy Social Demographics Land area (’000 sqkm)
 
Source: elaborated from FAOSTAT (2004), UNDP (2004); World Bank (2004b) 
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Table A 3. Livestock and poverty in selected countries, 2004 
in grassland based 
systems
in mixed rainfed 
systems
in irrigated systems in other systems
Ethiopia 22,316,050 31.6 549,175 1,518,125 14.3 30.0 3,443 -21,206 62.4 high 35.5 63.2 1.0 0.3
Kenya 8,548,300 26.7 455,732 2,853,700 9.2 46.8 -929 1,045 52.8 high 31.1 68.0 0.0 0.9
Sudan 30,726,078 91.4 698,375 5,105,250 21.4 52.0 1,752 -65,043 54.9 high 77.1 19.4 3.1 0.5
Tanzania 10,918,547 29.5 360,540 935,000 13.2 29.4 -849 -221,505 65.8 high 17.2 81.7 0.0 1.0
Uganda 4,527,570 17.5 292,751 700,000 4.7 12.6 189 -3,387 69.4 high 19.8 79.0 0.0 1.0
Average 15,407,309 39.3 471,315 2,222,415 12.6 34.2 721 -62,019 61.1 high 36.1 62.3 0.8 0.7
Burkina Faso 4,621,720 35.5 141,019 237,250 7.8 22.9 -398 -62,374 66.8 high 34.7 65.2 0.0 0.0
Mali 6,526,620 50.2 259,052 578,280 16.2 39.0 -257 -34,695 66.0 high 62.0 37.9 0.0 0.1
Senegal 3,250,437 32.2 161,993 124,852 5.4 27.9 -14,055 -181,948 59.4 high 43.2 56.2 0.0 0.6
Average 4,799,592 39.3 187,355 313,461 9.8 29.9 -4,903 -93,006 64.1 high 46.6 53.1 0.0 0.2
Bangladesh 17,781,000 12.1 440,600 2,172,930 3.1 12.0 -1,594 -290,156 41.8 medium 0.4 60.0 39.2 0.4
India 194,115,008 18.2 5,940,764 91,100,000 7.5 30.4 -30,401 370,620 40.3 medium 2.2 46.1 51.4 0.2
Nepal 6,534,100 26.0 256,942 1,289,200 12.0 29.5 -162 30,428 40.2 medium 4.9 46.9 47.7 0.6
Average 72,810,036 18.8 2,212,769 31,520,710 7.5 24.0 -10,719 36,964 40.8 medium 2.5 51.0 46.1 0.4
Cambodia 3,147,200 22.3 194,570 20,400 7.7 19.5 -137 -26,622 52.6 high 2.5 90.1 6.7 0.7
Laos 2,212,450 39.1 93,700 6,000 7.7 14.5 -55 -19,405 32.9 medium 14.9 66.2 12.7 6.1
Thailand 8,307,680 13.2 2,167,148 620,000 1.9 20.7 631,431 -1,307,143 35.8 medium 0.9 51.0 47.3 0.7
Viet Nam 13,754,391 16.9 2,487,028 157,697 4.5 18.4 1,231 -647,532 33.5 medium 0.4 36.9 62.1 0.6
Average 6,855,430 22.9 1,235,612 201,024 5.5 18.3 158,118 -500,176 38.7 medium 4.7 61.1 32.2 2.0
Bolivia 7,748,226 88 440,205 281,500 5.4 36.5 -524 -26,859 16.3 low 65.0 34.3 0.0 0.6
Ecuador 6,530,518 50.2 616,931 2,465,310 4.6 43.0 -3,994 -6,800 34.5 medium 24.4 51.4 23.0 1.2
Peru 7,699,000 28.3 939,807 1,246,330 2.8 33.0 -131,185 -14,513 33.5 medium 71.8 24.0 2.3 1.9
Average 7,325,915 55.5 665,648 1,331,047 4.3 37.5 -45,234 -16,057 28.1 medium 53.7 36.6 8.4 1.2
Total average 21,439,656 35.2 954,539 7,117,731 7.9 28.8 19,596 -126,859 46.5 medium 28.7 52.8 17.5 0.9





Meat (Mt) Milk (Mt) % of GDP







Livestock trade (net) Livestock and poverty








* assuming that livestock contribute to 75% of income in pastoral areas, 15% in rainfed production systems, 20% in irrigated areas and 1.5% in peri-urban zones 
Source: elaborated from FAOSTAT (2004), Thornton et al. (2002) and World Bank (2004b) Annex 
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Table A 4. Average, growth rate and variability of beef production 
1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003
  Ethiopia n.a. n.a. 277,172 n.a. n.a. 3.2 n.a. n.a. 1.4
  Kenya 247,257 222,962 271,552 2.2 2.8 2.6 2.2 2.0 2.1
  Sudan 251,843 229,637 274,049 1.7 -1.9 5.2 4.6 4.9 3.3
  Tanzania 202,982 185,250 220,714 2.0 3.5 1.6 2.5 2.7 2.9
  Uganda 86,126 77,668 94,584 2.1 1.7 2.7 6.3 6.6 1.4
Average 197,052 178,879 215,225 2.0 1.5 3.1 3.9 4.0 2.2
  Burkina Faso 43,477 35,824 51,130 3.6 3.1 4.8 1.2 1.2 1.2
  Mali 78,546 67,251 89,841 3.0 4.3 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.9
  Senegal 43,004 39,701 46,308 1.4 1.7 0.0 4.9 4.7 7.3
Average 55,009 47,592 62,426 2.7 3.0 2.3 2.7 2.5 3.5
  Bangladesh 150,848 136,746 164,949 1.9 1.3 2.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
  India 1,288,374 1,143,136 1,433,613 2.5 4.5 0.9 1.7 1.6 1.5
  Nepal 43,868 40,715 47,021 1.2 0.5 0.7 2.0 1.7 1.8
Average 494,363 440,199 548,527 1.8 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.5
  Cambodia 35,870 25,428 46,311 6.3 8.1 5.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
  Laos 11,165 6,482 15,849 9.2 11.0 7.0 1.1 1.1 1.2
  Thailand 195,251 185,816 204,685 1.1 6.2 -3.9 4.6 4.6 4.6
  Viet Nam 78,459 68,344 88,574 2.8 3.6 3.5 1.9 2.1 1.5
Average 80,186 71,518 88,855 4.8 7.2 2.9 2.2 2.3 2.2
  Bolivia 139,446 126,059 152,833 1.9 1.3 2.3 1.9 2.1 1.3
  Ecuador 135,628 100,623 170,634 5.1 4.2 5.5 1.0 1.0 1.0
  Peru 110,310 97,967 122,653 2.7 3.2 4.5 4.3 4.4 2.0
Average 128,461 108,216 148,707 3.2 2.9 4.1 2.4 2.5 1.4
Total average 191,014 169,281 212,748 2.9 3.4 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.2
Average supply (Mt) Annual growth rate Coefficient of variation of growth rate
Country
 
Source: elaborated from FAOSTAT (2004) 
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Table A 5. Average, growth rate and variability of milk production 
1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003
  Ethiopia n.a. n.a. 1,168,937 n.a. n.a. 7.4 n.a. n.a. 1.4
  Kenya 2,270,287 2,091,471 2,449,103 2.3 4.5 3.9 2.1 2.0 2.3
  Sudan 3,881,957 3,066,307 4,697,606 4.2 5.5 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.0
  Tanzania 676,812 570,708 782,916 3.4 3.6 4.5 1.0 0.4 1.4
  Uganda 461,593 396,830 526,357 3.1 3.8 4.7 2.2 1.4 2.4
Average 1,822,662 1,531,329 2,113,995 3.3 4.3 4.5 1.7 1.3 1.7
  Burkina Faso 157,977 114,917 201,037 5.5 4.9 5.7 1.2 1.2 1.2
  Mali 421,123 357,188 485,057 3.0 2.2 3.6 1.0 1.9 0.5
  Senegal 120,864 114,052 127,675 1.1 3.0 -1.2 3.4 1.1 7.3
Average 233,321 195,386 271,256 3.2 3.3 2.7 1.9 1.4 3.0
  Bangladesh 1,805,400 1,508,793 2,102,008 3.2 3.9 1.4 0.9 0.2 1.7
  India 63,070,569 50,109,455 76,031,684 4.1 3.7 4.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
  Nepal 1,000,196 874,134 1,126,259 2.5 2.2 3.0 0.5 0.7 0.3
Average 21,958,722 17,497,461 26,419,983 3.3 3.3 2.9 0.6 0.4 0.7
  Cambodia 17,277 17,034 17,521 0.2 1.3 -1.1 23.6 1.1 12.5
  Laos 5,179 4,600 5,757 2.4 4.0 0.9 1.5 0.9 3.6
  Thailand 279,176 105,177 453,176 14.2 13.4 11.7 0.8 0.7 0.8
  Viet Nam 67,833 57,258 78,408 3.4 2.5 9.3 1.8 1.2 1.5
Average 92,366 46,017 138,716 5.1 5.3 5.2 6.9 1.0 4.6
  Bolivia 198,407 148,405 248,409 4.7 3.3 4.0 3.1 0.9 3.2
  Ecuador 1,776,151 1,456,433 2,095,869 3.7 4.1 3.3 1.3 0.9 1.7
  Peru 927,423 821,469 1,033,378 2.2 -0.3 4.3 1.3 8.7 0.3
Average 967,327 808,769 1,125,885 3.5 2.4 3.9 1.9 3.5 1.7
Total average 5,014,880 4,015,792 6,013,967 3.7 3.7 3.8 2.6 1.5 2.4
Average supply (Mt) Annual growth rate Coefficient of variation of growth rate
Country
 
Source: elaborated from FAOSTAT (2004) Annex 
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Table A 6. Average, growth rate and variability of poultry production 
1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003
  Ethiopia n.a. n.a. 40,641 n.a. n.a. 4.3 n.a. n.a. 2.5
  Kenya 47,406 43,016 51,797 1.9 2.3 1.1 3.4 4.1 2.9
  Sudan 24,520 21,122 27,918 2.7 2.4 2.7 0.6 0.4 0.7
  Tanzania 31,782 24,096 39,469 7.3 11.2 6.4 1.0 0.7 1.5
  Uganda 35,304 28,842 41,767 3.8 3.5 5.1 1.3 1.3 1.3
Average 34,753 29,269 40,238 3.9 4.8 3.9 1.6 1.6 1.8
  Burkina Faso 20,516 16,656 24,377 4.2 6.0 3.9 0.8 0.7 0.6
  Mali 25,325 22,529 28,122 2.4 3.1 3.2 1.7 1.3 2.1
  Senegal 43,464 27,603 59,325 7.8 12.5 -0.4 1.7 0.9 23.8
Average 29,769 22,263 37,274 4.8 7.2 2.2 1.4 1.0 8.8
  Bangladesh 92,890 73,893 111,888 4.0 5.6 1.0 1.3 0.6 2.7
  India 650,144 325,502 974,786 11.7 14.2 12.6 1.0 0.9 1.0
  Nepal 9,689 7,272 12,106 5.6 7.6 5.7 1.4 1.7 0.6
Average 250,908 135,556 366,260 7.1 9.1 6.4 1.2 1.1 1.4
  Cambodia 19,884 16,074 23,693 4.1 6.2 3.0 1.9 1.1 4.6
  Laos 9,428 6,871 11,985 5.4 4.4 5.3 1.7 2.4 1.3
  Thailand 1,159,707 795,226 1,524,187 7.3 11.2 6.4 1.0 0.7 1.5
  Viet Nam 233,982 161,160 306,803 6.1 2.0 11.5 1.9 7.5 1.1
Average 355,750 244,833 466,667 5.7 5.9 6.5 1.6 2.9 2.1
  Bolivia 80,092 37,188 122,997 12.0 14.7 4.3 1.3 1.1 1.2
  Ecuador 110,948 60,909 160,987 9.3 8.4 8.4 1.6 0.9 1.8
  Peru 363,287 252,614 473,959 6.3 5.1 7.7 1.5 2.2 0.4
Average 184,776 116,904 252,648 9.2 9.4 6.8 1.5 1.4 1.2
Total average 171,191 109,765 232,617 6.2 7.3 5.2 1.5 1.6 3.1
Average supply (Mt) Annual growth rate Coefficient of variation of growth rate
Country
 
Source: elaborated from FAOSTAT (2004) Annex 
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Table A 7. Average, growth rate and variability of egg production 
1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003
  Ethiopia n.a. n.a. 31,346 n.a. n.a. 3.7 n.a. n.a. 2.8
  Kenya 47,711 39,363 56,058 3.2 1.4 3.2 2.3 4.5 1.3
  Sudan 37,330 32,023 42,636 2.9 3.5 2.6 0.7 0.6 0.8
  Tanzania 32,483 29,707 35,259 2.0 5.5 -0.6 2.4 0.9 -7.0
  Uganda 16,851 14,540 19,161 2.9 3.3 3.1 1.6 1.5 1.6
Average 33,593 28,908 36,892 2.7 3.4 2.4 1.8 1.9 -0.1
  Burkina Faso 16,047 14,825 17,270 1.6 2.7 0.8 1.7 1.3 1.5
  Mali 11,476 11,502 11,450 -0.1 1.8 -1.9 14.3 1.9 -3.5
  Senegal 23,123 14,030 32,215 8.7 13.6 0.8 1.1 0.6 1.6
Average 16,882 13,452 20,312 3.4 6.0 -0.1 5.7 1.3 -0.1
  Bangladesh 112,055 77,639 146,471 5.8 4.5 4.0 1.9 2.4 1.5
  India 1,399,109 1,074,499 1,723,720 4.8 5.5 4.4 0.5 0.4 0.5
  Nepal 19,100 15,303 22,897 4.1 4.2 4.1 2.7 4.6 0.8
Average 510,088 389,147 631,029 4.9 4.7 4.1 1.7 2.5 0.9
  Cambodia 12,744 10,825 14,663 3.1 3.6 2.6 1.0 0.6 1.4
  Laos 6,445 4,326 8,564 6.3 0.1 14.3 1.8 3.7 1.1
  Thailand 708,363 613,356 803,369 3.0 6.2 0.6 2.4 1.9 2.8
  Viet Nam 137,985 96,936 179,034 6.0 5.2 6.0 1.0 1.4 0.7
Average 216,384 181,361 251,407 4.6 3.8 5.9 1.5 1.9 1.5
  Bolivia 44,472 38,514 50,429 2.5 10.2 -7.6 4.4 1.3 -7.0
  Ecuador 56,822 48,330 65,314 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.3 2.9
  Peru 121,170 97,450 144,890 4.2 4.6 5.2 1.7 2.1 1.0
Average 74,155 61,432 86,878 3.3 6.0 0.3 3.1 2.2 -1.0
Total average 170,220 134,860 205,304 3.8 4.8 2.5 2.8 2.0 0.2
Average supply (Mt) Annual growth rate Coefficient of variation of growth rate
Country
 
Source: elaborated from FAOSTAT (2004) Annex 
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Table A 8. Average, growth rate and variability of pigmeat production 
1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003
  Ethiopia n.a. n.a. 1,348 n.a. n.a. 2.6 n.a. n.a. 1.2
  Kenya 8,894 5,847 11,941 7.1 7.4 5.5 1.7 0.9 2.2
  Sudan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
  Tanzania 9,985 8,638 11,332 2.7 2.0 3.5 1.0 0.6 1.1
  Uganda 55,281 36,252 74,309 10.4 23.9 3.1 1.9 1.3 0.4
Average 24,720 16,912 24,732 6.7 11.1 3.7 1.5 0.9 1.2
  Burkina Faso 6,827 5,640 8,014 3.6 3.3 5.1 0.7 0.5 0.7
  Mali 1,949 1,844 2,055 1.3 3.1 0.7 4.6 4.1 2.7
  Senegal 5,797 5,013 6,582 2.6 -5.6 12.2 3.0 21.6 1.1
Average 4,858 4,166 5,550 2.5 0.3 6.0 2.8 8.7 1.5
  Bangladesh n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
  India 438,487 394,265 482,710 2.1 4.0 -0.1 1.8 1.0 7.1
  Nepal 11,125 8,864 13,386 4.3 5.1 4.7 0.7 0.8 0.5
Average 224,806 201,564 248,048 3.2 4.6 2.3 1.3 0.9 3.8
  Cambodia 78,589 60,365 96,814 5.1 7.6 3.2 1.8 1.4 2.1
  Laos 25,595 20,812 30,378 3.4 2.4 2.2 2.4 3.3 1.9
  Thailand 448,389 356,031 540,748 4.2 4.6 3.3 2.5 2.3 2.7
  Viet Nam 1,024,071 701,326 1,346,816 6.4 5.2 7.1 0.6 0.8 0.4
Average 394,161 284,633 503,689 4.7 5.0 4.0 1.8 1.9 1.8
  Bolivia 68,155 58,526 77,784 3.1 1.9 6.6 2.2 7.8 1.1
  Ecuador 91,470 70,051 112,889 4.6 2.9 6.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
  Peru 72,481 66,146 78,816 1.9 3.6 0.5 3.0 1.7 5.6
Average 77,369 64,908 89,830 3.2 2.8 4.5 2.3 3.6 2.7
Total average 145,183 114,437 174,370 4.1 4.7 4.1 1.9 3.2 2.2
Average supply (Mt) Annual growth rate Coefficient of variation of growth rate
Country
 
Source: elaborated from FAOSTAT (2004) Annex 
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Table A 9. Average, growth rate and variability of sheep and goat meat production 
1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 1984-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003
  Ethiopia n.a. n.a. 63,170 n.a. n.a. 1.1 n.a. n.a. 3.1
  Kenya 54,236 51,135 57,338 1.5 4.4 0.0 4.8 2.4 47.0
  Sudan 186,549 115,831 257,267 7.2 6.3 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.5
  Tanzania 34,612 30,613 38,610 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.0 0.9 1.1
  Uganda 25,039 21,639 28,440 2.6 1.5 2.7 2.3 3.8 0.6
Average 75,109 54,804 88,965 3.4 3.6 1.5 2.4 2.1 10.7
  Burkina Faso 30,283 25,539 35,027 3.5 5.8 2.4 0.8 0.6 0.6
  Mali 49,065 37,535 60,595 4.8 3.6 6.4 1.2 2.4 0.5
  Senegal 24,910 20,022 29,798 4.3 7.2 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.1
Average 34,753 27,699 41,807 4.2 5.5 3.7 1.2 1.4 0.8
  Bangladesh 95,863 67,684 124,041 6.1 8.0 3.2 1.1 0.8 1.2
  India 646,473 597,405 695,542 1.5 2.1 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9
  Nepal 34,443 30,628 38,258 2.3 2.3 2.8 0.7 0.7 0.7
Average 258,926 231,906 285,947 3.3 4.1 2.3 0.9 0.8 0.9
  Cambodia 0 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
  Laos 328 233 422 6.2 6.8 6.5 1.5 1.9 0.9
  Thailand 849 926 771 0.0 11.5 -2.9 4.9 1.0 2.6
  Viet Nam 3,742 2,828 4,656 4.0 -2.4 4.7 2.1 23.5 1.1
Average 1,230 997 1,462 3.4 5.3 2.8 2.8 8.8 1.5
  Bolivia 19,318 17,660 20,975 1.8 1.3 2.3 1.8 3.3 0.6
  Ecuador 6,308 4,972 7,644 3.7 0.5 3.1 2.5 5.6 1.6
  Peru 25,842 19,492 32,193 3.3 2.5 5.9 -19.5 -10.4 1.8
Average 17,156 14,041 20,271 2.9 1.4 3.8 -5.1 -0.5 1.3
Total average 77,435 65,889 87,690 3.4 4.0 2.8 0.5 2.5 3.0
Average supply (Mt) Annual growth rate Variability of growth rate
Country
 
Source: elaborated from FAOSTAT (2004) 